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ABSTRACT
Until recent years, most public and nonprofit management studies have focused on the
determinants of turnover rather than the consequences. In this line of literature, a better
theory of turnover for public and nonprofit organizations, especially the one focused on
outcomes of turnover, is needed. This dissertation seeks to advance our knowledge on the
issues of turnover and organizational performance in public and nonprofit management.
Using the three-paper model, the dissertation not only develops a theoretical model on
turnover and performance, but also conduct empirical testing on how turnover affects the
performance of public and nonprofit organizations.
Specifically, the first essay presents an economic model based on turnover
cost-benefit theories by incorporating labor market conditions and quality of employees,
which can be applied regardless of sector and industry. To do so, I re-evaluate turnover
and retention costs that change according to employee quality and labor supply and
demand. I also propose several testable hypotheses for future scholars, which enable them
to examine under what conditions the optimal rates of turnover change and how public
managers would benefit from an occurrence of turnover. The second essay investigates
the effects of employee turnover on organizational performance in Florida school
districts, distinguishing types of turnover as voluntary and involuntary. In the essay, I find
an inverted-U shaped relationship between involuntary turnover and organizational
performance, first positive and then negative. The last essay tests an inverted-U shaped
relationship in the context of the United Way nonprofit organizations. Findings suggest
that governing board turnover rates have a nonlinear effect on nonprofit financial
capacity, first positive and then negative. Taken together, both theoretical and empirical
investigations in this dissertation suggest that optimal turnover rates exist and that those
ii
can vary by sector. The findings provide an important lesson for both scholars and
practitioners that turnover should be appropriately managed, not necessarily minimized.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Turnover is inevitable across organizations regardless of sector and industry, and
notwithstanding individuals’ job security (Stahl, 1962). When personnel turnover occurs,
public managers incur extra costs to conduct exit interviews, start a search procedure, and
replace these workers (Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez, 2011). Turnover, as a result, has
been regarded as an aspect of organizational performance that should be minimized (e.g.,
Crewson, 1997; Kim, 2002; Wright and Kim, 2004; Langbein and Stazyk, 2018) due to
its significant costs to organizations.
Two dominant theories that explain the turnover-performance link are human and
social capital theories and cost-benefit theories. Human and social capital theory contend
that turnover is always costly because it can hurt an organization’s human and social
capital; a new employee needs time to be socialized and trained, which can impose costs
to the organization (Strober, 1990). Abelson and Baysinger (1984), however, propose
cost-benefit theories of turnover that posit an inverted-U shaped relationship between
turnover and performance. They argue that at low to moderate turnover rates,
organizations can benefit by reducing unnecessary retention costs (and then distributing
the resources to other core functions of organizations). If turnover is too excessive,
however, its costs can outweigh its benefits thereby hurting organizational performance.
Turnover, thus, might have a nonlinear effect on performance and needs to be evaluated
based on its costs and benefits that are imposed to organizations; not all turnover events
are necessarily bad.
The core argument of cost-benefit theories is that each organization has an
optimal turnover rate and every turnover rate deviating from the optimal turnover rate can
1
be a sign of organizational inefficiency. In other words, too low or too high turnover rates
are not desirable in terms of organizational performance. The conventional assumption of
the mainstream literature in public and business management is that low turnover rates
are more desirable compared to high levels of turnover (Glebbeek and Bax, 2004;
Huselid, 1995). Managerial efforts should, therefore, focus on minimizing turnover rather
than managing it.
This dissertation investigates the issues of turnover and provides insights on how
to manage turnover to improve organizational performance. In doing so, I present a
theoretical model of turnover and performance incorporating labor market conditions and
employee quality in Chapter 2. The following two chapters, Chapters 3 and 4, conduct
empirical tests on the relationship between turnover and performance in two different
contexts: employee turnover in public organizations, and governing board member
turnover in nonprofit organizations. Together, the dissertation adds valuable knowledge to
the evidence base on turnover and performance management. Before providing a brief
overview of each chapter, I first review previous studies on the effect of turnover on
organizational performance to better clarify the contribution of my work.
1.2 Literature Review
Theoretically, turnover can have both advantages and disadvantages in term of
organizational performance, as turnover often brings new employees who have better sets
of skills, while at the same time imposing costs to an organization for searching and
hiring the replacement (Call et al., 2015; Hausknecht and Holwerda, 2013). Meta-analytic
results (Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw, 2011) suggest a negative relationship between
organizational turnover and organizational performance. Yet, recent studies argue that the
relationship is not simply linear, but instead might be nonlinear; and they find some
support for an inverted-U shaped relationship between turnover and performance (An,
2
2015; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017; Siebert and Zubanov, 2009).
However, the theoretical argument between those studies is not entirely clear and
often conflicts each other. For instance, Meier and Hicklin (2008) find the inverted-U
shaped relationship for the first time distinguishing levels of task difficulty in the context
of education. The key argument in the study is that new ideas from new teachers would
be more valuable for high levels of task difficulty (e.g., college entrance exams) while the
benefits would be marginal for state standardized exams since task difficulty for those
exams is low. The task difficulty argument, however, does not hold in the study that
examines retail stores in England where Siebert and Zubanov (2009) find an inverted-U
shaped relationship between part-time employee turnover rates and annual sales, but, a
negative linear relationship between full-time employee turnover rates and annual sales.
More recently, Moon (2017) tests the nonlinear hypothesis using voluntary turnover rates
in federal agencies and finds empirical support between voluntary turnover and goal
attainment. Based on the findings, he contends that low levels of voluntary turnover can
initially improve organizational performance through new employees who can revitalize
the stagnated workforce with new ideas and innovation.
The aforementioned studies provide not only mixed empirical results but also
provide different mechanisms to explain the effects of organizational turnover on
organizational performance. Recently, scholars propose context-emergent (Nyberg and
Ployhart, 2013) and capacity-based theories (Hausknecht and Holwerda, 2013) to better
understand the turnover-performance link. The former emphasizes the role of context
(i.g., organizational size, timing of changes, etc.) and the latter highlights the quality of
leavers, newcomers, and remaining employees as key capacity factors that result in the
different effects of turnover on organizational performance. In this dissertation, I plan to
illustrate how optimal turnover rates would change based on labor market conditions, as
well as how the effects of turnover would differ based on organizational and
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environmental characteristics. I examine these issues through the lenses of the
cost-benefit theories and develop both theoretical models and empirical testing. To these
ends, I provide a synopsis of Chapters 2 to 4.
1.3 Overview
In Chapter 2, I seek to advance the theory of turnover and performance, incorporating
labor market conditions and the quality of employees and considering costs and benefits
to organizations. I first challenge a common assumption in turnover-performance studies
that organizations can find replacements as soon as the turnover occurs since many
organizations often have a difficulty finding a suitable job candidate once a current
employee announces her/his last day of work. The job market can be indeed notorious in
searching for a suitable job candidate due to limited quality labor supply and the
asymmetry of information between future employers and employees. Therefore, the
failure to account for these factors can mislead our understanding of the relationship
between turnover and the performance of organizations. Understanding labor market
conditions is important since it also often determines the quality of employees. The
chapter introduces a set of assumptions regarding how turnover and retention costs would
differ based on labor market conditions and the quality of employees in public sector.
Based on these I also propose a set of testable propositions for future scholars, which
posit the turnover-performance relationships being conditioned on many different
organizational and environmental contextual factors.
Chapter 3 incorporates the quality of employees into the cost-benefit theories and
test the relationship between employee turnover and organizational performance in the
public sector using Florida school district data from 2012 to 2014. More specifically, this
chapter criticizes the common use of absolute measures in the literature and distinguishes
types of turnover as voluntary and involuntary. I argue that employees with more
4
alternative options (which indicates that they are likely to be good performers) are more
likely to leave organizations (voluntary turnover), and that this type of turnover can
detrimentally affect organizational performance. In contrast, firing low-performing
employees (involuntary turnover) can improve organizational performance until turnover
costs become excessive. The results suggest that involuntary turnover has an inverted-U
shaped relationship with organizational performance, which is first positive and then
negative and that absolute turnover rates can mask the complex and dissimilar
relationships between various types of turnover and organizational performance.
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of governing board turnover on organizational
financial capacity in the context of nonprofit organizations. Governing board members in
nonprofits serve as boundary spanners who link the organization with the external
environment, and also act as principals who ensure that critical resources are spent to
achieve organizational missions. They, therefore, play a critical role in attracting and
utilizing financial resources. Given its importance, any turnover occurring to the
governing board should affect the financial capacity of the organization. While the
relationship between attributes of the nonprofit governing board and organizational
performance has been an enduring research topic, we know very little about whether and
how governing board turnover would affect the performance of nonprofit organizations,
especially with regard to financial capacity. Adopting theoretical perspectives from
cost-benefit, resource dependency, and agency theory, I develop a nonlinear hypothesis
between governing board turnover and nonprofits’ financial capacity. Using
cross-sectional data constructed based on different sources, I test the hypothesis in the
context of the United Way organizations. I find general support for my hypothesis, which
yields implications for both research and practice of nonprofit human resources
management.
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2. OPTIMAL TURNOVER RATES AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS: THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
2.1 Introduction
High-quality human capital is essential in all organizations (Cho and Park, 2011)
regardless of sector and industry. To acquire and sustain high-quality human capital,
organizations invest a significant amount of human and financial resources in hiring and
training employees (Lee and Mitchell, 1994). Yet, once those employees leave the
organization, the investments become sunk costs and organizations need to allocate
resources, again, in hiring and training of employees who replace the ones leaving.
Because of the significant turnover costs, public management literature generally focuses
on minimizing turnover rates in organizations. This view aligns with human and social
capital theories, which suggest that employee turnover is negatively associated with
organizational performance, because turnover can cause the loss of firm-specific capital
and skills that have been acquired and possessed by employees over time and also
destabilize network structure among employees within the organization.
However, minimizing turnover rates to zero cannot always be the best managerial
practice since it can distract organizations from their core functions. Abelson and
Baysinger (1984) propose a theoretical framework of cost-benefit suggesting an inverted
U-shaped relationship between employee turnover and organizational performance, first
positive and then negative. In the similar vein, public management scholars have
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developed theoretical explanations on the potential nonlinear relationship between
turnover and performance, incorporating a classic public administration hypothesis
proposed by Mosher and Kingsley (1936). To illustrate, at low levels of turnover, new
hires who replace former employees can bring new ideas that can lead to positive changes
in organizations and that can prevent organizational rigidity or inflexibility, all of which
can positively affect organizational performance (Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017;
Lee, 2017). Once turnover occurs too frequently, however, the total turnover costs can
outweigh the benefits, thereby detrimentally affecting the organizational performance.
There are two implicit assumptions in this line of literature, which are not necessarily the
case; first, organizations can find replacements right after the employee who is leaving
announces her/his last day at work, and second, the average quality of new hires is greater
or at least equal to the average quality of leavers. In other words, previous studies on the
turnover-performance relationship do not often take labor market conditions and the
quality of labor into consideration.
In this chapter, I incorporate labor market conditions and the quality of labor into
the theoretical framework of cost-benefit to provide a better understanding of the
turnover-performance link in the context of public organizations. The chapter proceeds as
follows. I first introduce the cost-benefit model of turnover developed by Abelson and
Baysinger (1984), and argue that Optimal Turnover Rates (OTR) would differ by sector
due to the different labor supply and demand curves. Second, I show how changes in
labor market conditions (increases in labor supply/demand) affect OTR in public
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organizations. Third, I develop parsimonious decision-theoretic models of
turnover-performance focusing on the quality of individuals, both those who leave the
organization and those who newly enter the organization. The following discusses how
turnover affect organizational performance and how the relationships differ according to
various organizational-level characteristics. In doing so, I provide cases on whether and
how to manage or minimize the turnover. After that, I conclude with discussions and
implications.
2.2 An Overview of Optimal Turnover Rates from Cost-Benefit Theories
The origin of cost-benefit theories is based on the idea that not all types of turnover are
dysfunctional (Abelson and Baysinger, 1984; Meier and Hicklin, 2008); turnover should
be evaluated based on its costs imposed to an organization. For instance, instead of
spending massive retaining costs to minimize turnover rates to zero (regarding turnover
as a bad thing), coping with a certain level of turnover can be a more cost-efficient way
for an organization to manage performance (Dalton and Todor, 1979, 226). There can be
an OTR for an organization, and the efforts to make the turnover rate close to OTR is a
more desirable practice than making the rate to zero. If OTR exists, any turnover rates
that deviate from it can be deemed as a sign of the organization being dysfunctional and
inefficient. The goal of human resource management in any organizations, therefore, is to
achieve OTR by balancing turnover costs (TC hereafter) and retention costs (RC
hereafter). Abelson and Baysinger (1984) define TC as “the costs associated with the
separation of incumbent employees plus the costs of searching for and training new
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employees” (333) and RC as costs that occur to decrease turnover rates in an organization
using such tools as higher compensation, promotions, and inter-departmental transfers.
Figure 2.1 depicts the basic economic model of optimal turnover originally proposed by
Abelson and Baysinger (1984) and shows the optimal rate of turnover in an organization
is where RC and TC meet.
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Source: Abelson and Baysinger (1984).
Figure 2.1: A model of optimal turnover rate
In figure 2.1, y- and x-axis represent all turnover-related costs and turnover rates,
respectively. From the perspectives of human resource management, the low turnover
rates can be the result of high RC, given that RC increases through attempts to reduce
turnover rates by spending organizational resources to retain employees (Abelson and
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Baysinger, 1984, 333). If an organization spends higher RC than the optimal point where
TC and RC cross over, TC will go down as the organization successfully retains the
current employees. In this case, as illustrated in the figure, at any other point besides the
optimal one, Total Turnover Costs (TTC), the sum of vertical lines of RC and TC, are
higher, which indicates that the organization is functioning inefficiently. A key takeaway
from this figure is that if the RC curve is placed higher than the TC curve, an organization
can improve its performance by redesigning their retention policies. In other words, if the
organization pays equally high compensation for both poorly performing employees as
well as skilled ones, managers may want to correct this practice, thereby increasing the
efficiency of the organization. In the opposite case where the TC curve is higher than the
RC curve, unless organizations can increase the retention costs to reduce turnover rates,
the occurrence of any turnover hurts organizational performance. To summarize, the key
three assumptions derived from the model are; first, when turnover rates increase and
RC>TC, organizational performance is more likely to increase; second, when turnover
rates increase and RC<TC, organizational performance is more likely to decrease; and
third, when TC6=RC, an organization is functioning inefficiently.
2.3 Optimal Turnover Rates and Labor Market Conditions
The cost-benefit theory suggests that turnover rates and turnover costs play an important
role in determining the effectiveness/efficiency of organizations. Previous studies that
investigate the turnover-performance link show a negative (e.g., Alexander, Bloom, and
Nuchols, 1994; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Meier, Mastracci, and Wilson, 2006),
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positive (e.g., Keck, 1997; Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992), and nonlinear
relationship (e.g., An, 2015; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017) between the two.
The mixed results on this topic call for a better theory that can explain the phenomena. I
argue that to better understand the link, labor market conditions need to be considered,
since the labor supply and demand are not exogenous to turnover rates and costs. In other
words, changes in the labor supply and/or demand are more likely to affect turnover costs
and retention policies in organizations. And an employee’s decision to quit (or a
manager’s decision to fire an employee) can also be conditioned on the labor market
conditions. This chapter defines the labor demand as “the number of positions for
qualified individuals” that organizations advertise for a certain level of compensations,
and the labor supply as “the number of qualified individuals willing to take those
positions at a given level of compensation” (Grissom, Viano, and Selin, 2016, 242). The
following section describes how OTR would differ by sector and how public managers
can respond to changes in the labor supply and demand in managing human resources.1
2.3.1 Sectoral Differences in Optimal Turnover Rates
An exit of bureaucrats poses transactional costs to a government organization such as
searching, hiring, and bargaining. While conducting such activities to hire a new
employee, a government agency participates in a labor market where bureaucrats are the
suppliers of labor (supply curve) and the agency is a buyer (demand curve) (Teodoro,
2015). The conditions of the governmental labor market, such as labor supply, can
1 Although I investigate whether OTR would differ between sector (public vs. private), the argument is
more likely to hold between industries as well.
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substantially affect the agency’s efforts to find a replacement. From a perspective of job
candidates, the labor market entry selection – i.e. whether the candidates will work in a
public or private organization – is not random; job candidates select a labor market based
on their preferences (e.g., salaries, work hours, location, task significance, social impact,
ambition, etc.). The non-random labor market entry process can make each sector or
industry labor market unique. For simplicity, this chapter assumes that the number of
qualified individuals for governmental jobs will vary depending on skill requirements and
salary, holding motivation and ambition within sector constant.
Labor supply and demand curves of the public sector labor market are likely to
differ from the ones in the private sector, due to different levels of salary (Wilson, 1994),
job security (Rainey, 2009), and hierarchy (Downs, 1967). The different labor market
conditions in the public labor market can have different impacts on TC and RC curves in
the model of OTR. First, RC curves in the public sector labor market are less likely to
shift in comparison to the ones in the private sector, since public managers have fewer
managerial tools and options to retain bureaucrats; public managers cannot simply offer
higher salaries or provide promotions when a highly skilled bureaucrat wants to quit.
Second, skill requirements and low-salaries in the public sector would influence
the TC curve. In certain governmental agencies, acquiring policy-oriented knowledge or
agency-specific expertise is necessary (Bertelli and Lewis, 2012). For instance, in
regulatory agencies, without knowing regulatory laws and other detailed procedures,
bureaucrats often have trouble continuing their work. Knowledge about the red tape or
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other bureaucratic procedures is also required for a government employee. Public
organizations, however, are not often able to provide sufficient (at least material) rewards
to their employees for acquiring these specific knowledge and expertise. This is also an
issue when coupled with the public organization’s salary system, which is mostly
determined based on previous experience and degrees; federal employees are paid based
on their grade levels (or previous experience) and their degree level, not necessarily based
on their performance. The salary system can create a potential problem in recruiting
talented individuals, which can become even more severe over time. For instance,
regulatory requirements for operating a public water facility have become more complex
and technical than they were thirty years ago, which imposes much greater job
requirements (or skill requirements) on the bureaucrats who were recently hired in such
agencies compared to those who were employed before. Yet, due to an inflexible wage
system in the public sector, salaries for senior employees are more likely to be higher
than new employees who might possess better skills and technical expertise. Few
incentives to obtain agency-specific skills and knowledge, as well as a pay system that are
not based on performance, can drive potential job applicants away from getting into the
labor market for public organizations.
To sum up, I argue that the labor supply in the labor market for government
agencies might be scarce, compared to the market for private firms. In such cases, a
public agency’s costs of searching and hiring would be greater. If a talented job candidate
receives multiple offers, bargaining costs increase as well. Furthermore, for some
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governmental agencies (e.g., FBI and CIA), hiring processes often take years due to
background checks and the civil service exam. For these reasons, I posit that turnover
costs in a public labor market on average are greater than those in a private labor market,
especially when public managers have fewer means to retain employees compared to the
managers in their private counterparts.2 Applying this logic to Figure 2.1, TC curve is
more likely to move to the left due to higher turnover costs. Figure 2.2 depicts the new
OTR in public organizations. Based on the logic, the first proposition is:
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Figure 2.2: A model of optimal turnover rates in public organizations
2For simplicity, figure 2.2 assumes no differences in RC between public and private organizations. If
private organizations spend higher RC, the gap of optimal turnover rates between public and private organi-
zations is more likely to be greater (since optimal turnover rates for private organizations will be determined
at a higher point than it is illustrated in figure 2.2).
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Proposition 1. An optimal turnover rate for a public organization is determined at a
lower point than it is for a private organization.
There is natural turnover due to death, illness, or other reasons; some types of
turnover are simply unavoidable. If natural turnover rates in an organization are close to
OTR, managers would have less room for managing turnover. Because OTR in private
organizations are more likely to be at a higher point than the ones in public organizations,
assuming natural turnover rates are lower than those optimal turnover points, public
organizations are more likely to observe the negative effects of turnover on organizational
performance sooner than what private organizations would experience.3
2.3.2 Optimal Turnover Rates in Public Organizations Responding to Labor Mar-
ket Conditions
OTR of public organizations can change according to the labor market conditions, which
are dynamic rather than static. I will provide two cases to examine how OTR would
change in public organizations when the labor supply or demand increases. First, suppose
that the public labor market becomes more competitive due to an influx of labor supply.
If the labor market becomes more competitive due to an increase in labor supply, public
managers can spend fewer resources on recruiting talented employees compared to
before. On the contrary, job seekers will have to invest more on cultivating their expertise
to acquire a job in the competitive labor market; or, they may be willing to accept a job
3 This argument holds true if natural turnover rates are randomly distributed across sectors. If natural
turnover rates are higher than OTR, this may indicate that organizations have a functional problem in re-
cruiting employees. In this case, every turnover is more likely to hurt organizational performance. This also
suggests that the probability of organizational survival in the long term is more likely to be low.
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with worse conditions, such as lower salary or more hours to work. From a perspective of
an organization, this means that the organization can get an equally skilled and qualified
worker with fewer costs. If a newly hired employee has already invested in developing
their skills getting through the job market, the organization can allocate human and
financial resources currently being spent on training new employees to other key
organizational activities. I, therefore, argue that an increase of labor supply will lower all
turnover-related costs (from TRC1 to TRC2) and shift TC curve to the right (lowering
turnover costs). When this occurs, OTR will be determined at a higher point, as shown in
figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal turnover rates responding to an increase in labor supply
In figure 2.3, the optimal turnover rate in a public organization moves from OTR1
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to OTR2 due to an increase of labor supply. In this case, the manager in the organization
has more room to manage organizational turnover. In other words, if the public
organization was functioning at OTR1 initially, once the labor supply increases, the
manager can encourage turnover by OTR2-OTR1 to improve organizational performance.
Proposition 2: When the labor supply increases, optimal turnover rates in a public
organization will be determined at a higher level.
Second, suppose that the demand for labor in public organizations increases. As
opposed to the first case that describes a more competitive labor market, turnover costs in
public organizations are more likely to be greater. To illustrate, when an employee leaves
her/his organization when the demand for labor is high in the labor market, an
organization would be less likely to find a replacement with similar levels of skills and
knowledge unless they offer higher compensations and better working conditions. Due to
inflexible human resources systems in public organizations in general, however, public
organizations are limited to offering and adjusting salaries or working conditions to
attract good/qualified candidates. In this regard, to overcome the challenge, public
managers can emphasize potential task significance and social impact that can be carried
through the work of public organizations (Gailmard and Patty, 2007). Public
organizations can also use their unique brands or reputations, if they have any, to attract
future employees or retain current employees (Carpenter, 2002; Lee and Whitford, 2013;
Teodoro and An, 2018). These managerial actions will raise turnover costs.
Figure 2.4 illustrates when there is a high level of labor demand in the market,
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Figure 2.4: Optimal turnover rates responding to an increase in demand for labor
turnover related costs for a public organization will first increase from TRC1 to TRC2.
Since the RC curve in the public organization is more likely to be fixed, TC curve in the
figure shifts to the left, which determines OTR at a lower point. In this case, public
managers are more likely to have less room for managing organizational turnover by
OTR1-OTR2 in Figure 2.4.
Proposition 3: When the demand for labor increases, optimal turnover rates in public
organizations will be determined at a lower level of turnover.
2.4 When Turnover Matters: Decision-Theoretic Models of Employee and Organi-
zational Turnover
In addition to the labor market conditions presented above, I now focus on incorporating
the quality of employee in the turnover-performance model. A key take away from the
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theories thus far is that excessively low or high turnover can be harmful to organizational
performance since organizations are spending more resources on either retention or
turnover costs unnecessarily; organizations can spend less (or more) resources on
retaining employees to encourage (or discourage) turnover rates to maximize
organizational performance. The assumption, however, is less likely to be applied to
public organizations, given that public managers have fewer managerial tools due to
inflexible reward systems in the public sector. Public management scholars, therefore,
focus more on the quality of employees when examining the relationship between
turnover and performance in a public organization, and argue that turnover can be
beneficial to the organization if replacements of leavers are more likely to bring new
ideas, expertise, and skills that can revitalize the current workforce until the total turnover
costs exceed such benefits (see, Lee, 2017; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017). The
assumption can be formally expressed as:
Pn−TC > Pl, (2.1)
where Pn indicates performance of a new recruit, Pl denotes performance of the leaver,
and TC is turnover costs that include Costs of Recruitment (CR), Costs of Training new
recruit (CT), and Costs of Learning about organization-specific skills and the culture of
the organization (CL).
Equation 2.1 suggests that if a new recruit performs better compared to the leaver,
accounting for the total turnover costs (C), encouraging turnover can be a strategic action
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for public managers: Pn−Pl−TC > 0, which means that turnover can benefit the
organization. To illustrate, if bureaucrats are significantly underperforming, by laying off
or letting them go, public managers can remedy the incorrect hiring decisions thereby
improving organizational performance. The following equation illustrates the opposite
case when the new recruiter’s performance is equal to or less than the leaver’s
performance.
Pn−TC < Pl (2.2)
If it is the case for equation 2.2, an occurrence of turnover is more likely to hurt
organizational performance. In this situation, the best managerial strategy for public
managers would be retaining employees who intend to leave, especially when those
employees are highly skilled and valued in the organization. The key assumption in
equations 2.1 and 2.2 is that an organization can immediately find a replacement once an
employee leaves. If the organization cannot find a replacement on time, turnover costs
become greater as organizations operate until they find a suitable replacement.
Furthermore, comparing a new recruit’s performance to the leaver’s one might not be
realistic since experience is one of the key factors that determine an individual’s
performance in the organization (Hunter and Thatcher, 2007; Juenke, 2005; Quin´ones,
Ford, and Teachout, 1995). In other words, when a new employee is hired, due to the
learning curve and time to adjust to the new environment, it is more likely that she/he
might not perform as good as the leaver. Thus, when a manager is hiring a new employee,
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perhaps rather than a direct comparison of performance between the newcomer and
leaver, she/he might consider potential qualities of candidates, which may appear after
some time. Formally put,
T
∑
t=0
(Pn,t−TCt)> T ·Pl, where t=time (2.3)
In equation 2.3, when t = 0, Pn,t is more likely to be equal to zero, given that it is
when the time of the leaver’s departure. CR can be also zero after the organization hires a
replacement of the leaver, since it is after the organization recruits the replacement. Note
that Pn,t increases over time while CT and CL decrease due to the learning effect of the
new employee. Suppose that the organization benefits from the occurrence of turnover at
t3. Equation 2.3 can be rewritten as
Pn,0 +Pn,1 +Pn,2 +Pn,3− (TC0 +TC1 +TC2 +TC3)−Pl ·3 > 0 (turnover benefits the
organization). If T is shorter than 3 in this example, the effects of turnover are more
likely to be negative. When it comes to a hiring decision, the realization of T for a public
organization is more likely to depend on managerial patience (considering the long-term
performance of a replacement of the leaver rather than short-term). Yet, regardless of
levels of managerial patience, organizations would always prefer a shorter T , because
while T increases, the costs associated with waiting for the new hires to perform well
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increases.4,5 In addition, it is worth noting that public managers pay attention to the
performance of the organization as a whole, rather than focusing on the performance of
individual employees specifically. For instance, a manager’s level of patience might be
higher in an organization with lots of good performers, while the opposite is the case for
a manager who works in an organization with low quality of workers. In other words,
organizational-level characteristics can also affect the relationship between turnover and
performance. The following section explains four major factors that should be considered
in the effect of turnover on performance in public organizations: the qualities of
employees in an organization, labor market conditions (the labor supply and demand),
organizational size, and social capital in the organization.
2.4.1 Employee Quality in the Organization
Even if turnover rates are the same across organizations, the effects of organizational
turnover would be different depending on the quality of leavers (Hausknecht and
Holwerda, 2013), as well as the ones who remain in the organization. Reflecting the
notion of employee quality, recent public management scholars have distinguished types
of turnover as voluntary and involuntary (e.g., An, 2015; Lee, 2017; Moon, 2017), as
opposed to focusing on the quantity of turnover using total turnover rates (e.g., Meier and
Hicklin, 2008). The idea is that the distinct origins of each turnover would have a
4If T is always too long in organizations, this indicates that the organization may have a problem in their
hiring process or in attracting quality candidates from the labor market.
5If managerial patience is constant or if an organization has rules or policies that require a newcomer to
show a certain level of performance in a certain period, whether or not employee turnover improves organiza-
tional performance solely depends on a various individual, organizational, and environmental characteristics,
which can affect the length of T .
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different effect on organizational performance (see, An, 2015; Lee, 2017). For instance,
voluntary turnover would have a negative effect on organizational performance since
capable employees with more alternatives are more likely to quit, while involuntary
turnover would have an inverted-U shaped relationship due to the initial benefits of laying
off low-performing employees up to a certain point (An, 2015).
Though the categorization of voluntary and involuntary turnover is useful to
capture the quality of leavers, the previous studies only take the quality of leavers into
account; they do not fully capture other dynamics such as the quality of newcomers and
remaining employees in the workforce. Considering the quality of newcomers and
remaining employees in the organizational workforce is also equally important in
addition to the quality of leavers (Hausknecht and Holwerda, 2013), not only because the
average quality of remaining employees is conditioned on the quality of leavers but also
because managerial patience for new hires is more likely to be affected by the
performance of leavers. More importantly, both the quality of newcomers and remaining
employees are more likely to affect organizational performance. To illustrate, if
high-performing employees leave an organization, the effects of employee turnover are
more likely to be negative on organizational performance (McEvoy and Cascio, 1987).
The negative effects would become stronger if the rest of employees in the workforce are
relatively new (i.g. lack of experience or low skills) or the replacements of
high-performing leavers have low levels of human capital (Hausknecht and Holwerda,
2013). In this regard, I present three propositions:
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Proposition 4: When high-performing employees leave, the effects of organizational
turnover would be more detrimental.
Proposition 5: When the replacements of leavers have low levels of human capital, the
effects of organizational turnover would be more detrimental.
Proposition 6: If organizations are functioning with relatively inexperienced personnel
after an occurrence of turnover, the effects of organizational turnover would be more
detrimental.
2.4.2 Labor Market Conditions
Changes in labor supply and demand can affect turnover benefits or losses since the labor
market conditions affect total turnover costs. In other words, the turnover-performance
link is likely to be conditioned on the labor market condition. To illustrate how changes
in a labor market condition would affect the turnover-performance link, I use cases from
the context of K-12 education, which has a similar human resource management system
and turnover rates as other government organizations (Grissom, Viano, and Selin, 2016).
2.4.2.1 Case 1: Changing a hiring standard
The labor supply can increase or decrease depending on a hiring standard in a labor
market. In the K-12 education labor market, to apply for a teaching position in a K-12
school in the US, applicants need to have a teacher certification. Though the requirements
for the certification vary by states, in general one must have a bachelor’s degree granted
from an accredited college or university and should have passed tests for necessary
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knowledge and skills. Imagine a state passed a law that removes the requirement of the
teacher certification to overcome shortages of teachers for certain subjects. By lowering
the standard, we would expect that an increase of labor supply in the K-12 education
labor market; individuals without the teacher certification can now apply for a teaching
position in K-12 schools. In this case, TC costs will be reduced and/or turnover rates will
be determined at a lower level. To illustrate, first, for an organization, the costs of
searching are more likely to decrease due to an increased labor supply. Once a teacher
decides to leave, a school can find the replacement of the employee more easily. Second,
from the perspective of teachers, since the labor market becomes more competitive due to
an increase in the labor supply, employees are more likely to work harder to keep their
current job and that they will think about their exit options more carefully if they were
originally planning to leave the school. In these cases, all turnover-related costs are more
likely to decrease from the perspective of the organization as a whole.
Proposition 7: Turnover would be less detrimental to organizational performance when
the labor supply increases in the labor market, holding the labor demand constant.
2.4.2.2 Case 2: Environmental Turbulence
The second case will illustrate how changes in the labor demand would affect optimal
turnover rates in an organization. Here I provide an example of an occurrence of a natural
shock: Hurricane Katrina. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, many Hurricane
Katrina evacuees moved to neighboring states (e.g., Texas). Students from New Orleans
had to go to a school in the neighboring state since many schools in their hometown were
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devastated or closed for safety reasons. When the natural shock of student enrollments
occurred, teachers in the neighboring state were more burdened with higher workloads
simply because they had to take care of more students. If teachers leave the school due to
the increased workloads, it would be difficult for a school manager to find replacements
unless the school offers higher wages that would reflect the increase in the demand for
labor in the market; in this case, an occurrence of turnover would become more costly.
Proposition 8: Turnover would be more detrimental to organizational performance when
the labor demand increases in the labor market, holding the labor supply constant.
2.4.3 Organizational Size
The key idea of cost-benefit theory related to the turnover-performance link is that how to
better utilize resources in organizations. For instance, if organizations spend too much on
retention costs, encouraging turnover can be a managerial strategy since they can spend
saved resources on other core functions. If the key that determines the
turnover-performance link is the resource utilization, organizations with more resources
are more likely to be in a better position to manage turnover.
In a large organization, if turnover occurs, an immediate replacement of the leaver
might not be necessary; a public manager may find a substitute within the current
workforce of the organization until they find a suitable candidate. Larger organizations
also tend to accumulate and/or have more slack resources. If utilized resources in search
for a new employee are from those slack resources, organizations could potentially
benefit from the occurrence of turnover.
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When it comes to human resource management practices, larger organizations
tend to have better systems and practices prepared for the occurrence of turnover, such as
procedures and strategies for searching, hiring, and training new employees. If a small
organization does not invest in those managerial activities due to a small number of
turnovers, turnover costs could be even more significant when there is a sudden
occurrence of turnover.
Lastly, job candidates’ decision to apply for a position is not a random process.
Large organizations are more likely to attract job candidates for various reasons such as
higher reputations, brands, and job security (Barber et al., 1999; Carpenter, 2002; Lee
and Whitford, 2013). Furthermore, if job candidates are more motivated to work in a
public organization due to task significance and social impact, as they are being promoted
higher in the chain of command, they would have more opportunities to have a more
substantial impact on society. Taken together, turnover costs in large organizations would
be less costly.
Proposition 9: Turnover would be less detrimental to organizational performance in a
large organization.
2.4.4 Organizational Social Capital
At the organization level, turnover costs are not only attributable to replacement, training,
and learning costs but also related to the disruption of social network and capital in the
workforce. For instance, over time, employees not only develop skills and knowledge
through their job and experience but also build trust and network with others in the
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organization. A sudden leave of co-workers can, thus, have negative consequences in the
organizational social capital, such as hindering communications among employees as
well as between employees and managers, undermining trust among employees, deterring
cooperation among staff, and so forth. When a loss of human capital due to an occurrence
of turnover combines with that of social capital, the effects of turnover can be much
greater in an organization (Shaw et al., 1998). Those effects are more likely to be greater
if an organization has a high level of social capital in terms of social networks, cohesion,
and trust among employees.6
Proposition 10: Turnover costs will be greater at the organization level due to the
disruption of social network and capital in the workforce.
2.5 Minimizing Turnover: High Uncertainties in Hiring Processes
Thus far I have discussed the management of turnover, based on assumptions that
turnover is not always bad and that the effects of turnover on the organizational
performance should be considered. Yet, there is a situation where turnover always brings
out negative consequences on the organization and therefore should be minimized: when
an organization faces a high level of uncertainty in hiring processes.
Managers often deal with uncertainties in hiring procedures due to information
asymmetries between future employees and employers (Autor, 2001). The levels of
uncertainties could differ depending on the specific needs and skills required for certain
6 Within an organization with a low level of social capital, a decrease of social capital due to an event
of turnover would be minimal. Yet, if a low level of social capital attributes to high turnover rates in an
organization, turnover could still be detrimental to organizational performance.
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governmental jobs; the average and standard deviation of labor quality of bureaucrats can
vary. In practice, to ensure the quality of employees, organizations often implement
lengthy screening processes. As an example, when a university hires a faculty member,
they pay candidates to visit and interview each candidate for at least two to three days. If
a job requires higher skills and knowledge, or deals with security issues, the hiring
processes can take longer (e.g., FBI, CIA, and NASA), which in turn can impose
significant costs to organizations. If turnover occurs in such cases (positions that require
higher levels of skills and knowledge or necessitates extensive examinations to select
suitable candidates) and if the organization fails to replace the leaver promptly, the costs
of turnover become greater as the organization continues to operate (An, 2015). If a
public organization faces higher uncertainties in hiring a good quality of bureaucrats,
therefore, since the likelihood of hiring the inferior as the replacement of a leaver also
increases, they should focus more on minimizing turnover rather than taking the risk of
looking for the appropriate replacement.
Proposition 11: If organizations face higher uncertainties in hiring qualified employees,
public managers are better off focusing on minimizing organizational turnover rather
than managing it.
2.6 Discussions and Conclusions
This chapter presents theoretical investigations on how optimal turnover rates change
according to labor market conditions and the quality of employees, and how public
organizations can better tackle changes in the supply and demand of labor in the market
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to make and sustain a well-performing organization. It adds valuable knowledge to the
theory base on turnover and organizational performance in at least two main ways.
First, this study is among the first attempt to take labor market conditions and
employee quality into consideration to investigate the relationship between turnover and
performance in public organizations. Previous studies on this topic generally regard that
turnover as a disruptive event that negatively affects the organizational performance.
While several studies find that the effect of turnover may not merely be negative (An,
2015; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017) in public organizations, they offer different
mechanisms to explain the relationship between turnover and the performance of the
organizations, which calls for a better theory on organizational turnover. Incorporating
the supply and demand in the labor market and the quality of employees who leave and
newly enter the organization, I not only examine the turnover-related costs at the
individual level (i.e., employees and managers), but also explore the costs of turnover at
the organizational level. By doing so, this study yields insights on how public
organizations can better manage the occurrence of turnover to enhance the organizational
performance.
Second, I develop testable propositions throughout the paper, which encompass
the issues of sector differences in optimal turnover rates, the changes in the
turnover-performance link according to labor market conditions and employee quality,
and differences in the effects of turnover on performance according to various
organizational-level factors. These propositions merit further empirical investigation
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using different datasets and employing a variety of organizational contexts, including
different types of public, private, and nonprofit organizations. Such efforts would
advance our knowledge on how to deal with organizational turnover, which is one of the
critical issues in human resources and performance management in organizations.
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3. EMPLOYEE VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY TURNOVER AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: REVISITING THE CLASSIC
HYPOTHESIS FROM PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
3.1 Introduction
For the past few decades, education scholars have focused on teacher attrition and
mobility (Boe, Cook, and Sunderland, 2008; Ingersoll, 2001; Smith and Ingersoll, 2004)
and how these affect student achievement (Boyd et al., 2008; Dolton and Newson, 2003;
Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2013).1 Brummet, Gershenson, and Hayes (2017, 249-250)
argue that teacher turnover, regardless of teacher attrition and mobility, can harm student
achievement as it undermines the quality of education and leads to disruption in the
curricula and courses offered by schools (Shields et al., 2001). In short, previous studies
on education generally agree on the detrimental effect of teacher turnover on student
performance (Dolton and Newson, 2003; Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2013).
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the relationship between teacher mobility and
student achievement is not simply negative (Boyd et al., 2008). The effect may be net
positive if the quality of teachers who exit a school is inferior to that of the newcomers
(Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2013, 17). This indicates the possibility of a nonlinear
relationship between teacher turnover and student performance, which in fact has been
1 The distinction between mobility and attrition is an important aspect of managing turnover. When
investigating its effect on performance, the distinction becomes blurred or unnecessary given that both are
more likely to disrupt organizations (see, Boyd et al., 2008) as far as mobility and attrition occur voluntarily.
For the reason, this study does not necessarily distinguish teacher mobility and attrition in the later part.
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reported by business and public management studies on employee turnover (Abelson and
Baysinger, 1984; Glebbeek and Bax, 2004; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017;
Siebert and Zubanov, 2009) – replacing poorly-performing employees should enhance
organizational performance up to a certain point, after which such turnover starts to harm
organizations.
Public and business management literature have tested the nonlinear relationship
between organizational turnover and performance for the past decades. The empirical
results, however, have been mixed. This chapter argues that distinguishing between
different types of turnover would advance studies on the turnover-performance
relationship. Since initiatives and processes that trigger voluntary and involuntary
turnover are markedly different (Shaw et al., 1998; Selden and Moynihan, 2000), they
may have different effects on organizational performance. While turnover-performance
theories acknowledge the need for a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
turnover, most empirical research on this topic employs absolute turnover rates (see
meta-analytic results, Hausknecht and Trevor, 2011). This can hinder an accurate
evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with the two types of turnover, which can,
in turn, veil the outcomes that are linked to voluntary and involuntary turnover.
Using Florida school district data from 2009 to 2012, this study investigates the
linear and nonlinear relationship between voluntary and involuntary teacher turnover and
student Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) pass rates. The main argument
of this paper is that voluntary teacher turnover has a negative linear relationship with
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student performance while involuntary teacher turnover has a nonlinear relationship.
Taken together, I claim that absolute measures of turnover are inadequate in capturing a
more nuanced perspective on the consequences of turnover.
In the following sections, I first introduce the relevant literature from educational,
public, and private management that describes the turnover-performance relationship
with a primary focus on the nonlinear relationship between the two. Second, adopting
human and social capital and cost-benefit theories, I develop a theoretical distinction
between voluntary and involuntary turnover, and propose testable research hypotheses.
Third, I present findings that show the inverted-U shaped relationship between
involuntary turnover and organizational performance. After that, I conclude this paper
with implications and limitations.
3.2 Turnover and Performance: An Inverted-U Shaped Relationship
The idea of a nonlinear relationship between turnover and performance has been the
subject of a long-running theoretical argument in the field of public administration. In
their classic study, Public Personnel Administration, Mosher and Kingsley (1936, 286)
argue that moderate levels of turnover can provide a healthy working environment in any
agency and cause an inflow of new blood into the organization that prevents “the
hardening of caste.” Yet, Mosher and Kingsley (1936, 282-283) also claim that high
turnover rates can be harmful to any public organization, since high turnover is
significantly costly to these organizations. To fill empty spots caused by turnover and to
find and hire qualified workers, agencies need to invest considerable organizational assets
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in the search process (Wright and Davis, 2003; Meier and Hicklin, 2008) to sustain and
achieve their organizational goals. These assets may be human or financial resources, or
both. High labor turnover might also be indicative of other problems within the
organization, such as low employee morale (Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Rainey, 2009).
These arguments about the level of turnover within organizations suggest an inverted-U
shape relationship between performance and turnover. In other words, as turnover
initially increases within an organization we may expect an improvement in performance.
This improvement in performance has a threshold, however, after which the loss of more
employees will hurt performance. A theoretical development of this idea can be found in
the work of Abelson and Baysinger (1984), who suggest that turnover should be
evaluated considering its costs to organizations, since the impact of low and high turnover
rates can be substantially different.
Scholars have made attempts to provide empirical support to this nonlinear
assumption. Alexander, Bloom, and Nuchols (1994) and Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly III
(1984) test the inverted-U hypothesis with total turnover rates in community hospitals
and manufacturing firms, but they do not arrive at any findings that are statistically or
substantively significantly different from zero. Glebbeek and Bax (2004) find the
nonlinear relationship, first positive and then negative, with the same measure using data
from Dutch temporary employment agencies. However, they meet standard statistical
significance thresholds only for the squared term, instead of both the key independent
variable and its squared term. This impact further diminishes and shows a relationship of
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somewhat low magnitude, when they control for the change in performance in their
models. Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005) approach this hypothesis with voluntary
separations, but only find evidence of a negative relationship with performance.
More recent studies have found significant nonlinear relationships between
turnover and performance. Using an overall turnover measure, Meier and Hicklin (2008)
test the nonlinear relationship between separations and organizational performance in the
context of public schools in Texas. The authors claim that the costs of turnover to
organizations might differ by the types of tasks performed by employees in those
organizations. When turnover occurs, the costs of replacement for basic tasks are higher
than the benefits that the organization may draw from recruiting new employees;
productive gains cannot offset replacement costs, such as conducting an exit interview
and searching for new employees (575-576). Thus, at low task difficulty, the relationship
between organizational performance and turnover is negative. On the other hand, new
ideas from high skilled workers, in an environment of high task difficulty, could have a
positive impact on performance. Differentiating performance by high and low task
difficulty, Meier and Hicklin (2008) were the first to find evidence of an inverted-U
shaped relationship between turnover and performance at high levels of task difficulty in
public organizations. Siebert and Zubanov (2009) also reveal an inverted-U shaped
relationship in the impact of part-time employee turnover in English retail stores, but the
turnover rate of full-time employees does not support the same nonlinear relationship
hypothesis. The task difficulty argument that worked in Texas public schools does not
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seem to apply in English retail stores.
Most recently, Moon (2017) finds the inverted-U shaped relationship between
voluntary turnover and goal attainment in federal agencies. Although this is among the
first to find the inverted-U relationship between the two in the context of federal agencies,
this cannot be the last study that seeks the optimal turnover rates of public organizations,
given that federal agencies included in his sample have different goals and functions that
can determine organizational turnover in different ways. Furthermore, the nonlinear
relationship between involuntary turnover and organizational performance has not been
investigated, as Moon (2017) calls for future research. Taken together, most scholars have
used total turnover rates in organizations to test the inverted-U shaped relationship
between turnover and performance, except Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005) and Moon
(2017) who have used voluntary turnover. No study has neither theorized nor examined
the potential nonlinear effect of involuntary turnover on organizational performance. The
aim of this study is to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary turnover, and see
whether the inverted-U shaped relationship holds between each of these distinct turnover
measures and performance.
3.3 Voluntary and Involuntary Turnover
Voluntary turnover refers to when employees quit, that is when they decide to end their
relationship with organizations on their own, whereas involuntary turnover occurs when
employers fire or lay off workers (Hausknecht and Trevor, 2011; Selden and Moynihan,
2000; Shaw et al., 1998). Therefore, the key distinction between the two types of
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turnover lies in who initiated the process.
Scholars have noted the importance of distinguishing voluntary and involuntary
turnover. Using absolute turnover measures can be appropriate when all types of turnover
(both voluntary and involuntary) are randomly distributed (Abelson and Baysinger,
1984), which is a rare case in practice. Indeed, voluntary and involuntary turnover occur
based on different “etiologies” (Shaw et al., 1998, 520) and vary in the costs that turnover
imposes on the organization (Bludedorn, 1978). Thus, this study investigates the effects
of voluntary and involuntary separations on organizational performance separately.
3.3.1 Voluntary Turnover and Performance: A Linear and Negative Relationship
Human and social capital theories assert that every turnover is a disruptive event to
organizations (Dess and Shaw, 2001; Osterman, 1987; Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2005).
From an organization’s perspective, employee turnover indicates a loss of firm-specific
knowledge, skills, and abilities that have been acquired over time and possessed by the
person who exited the organization (Lee and Whitford, 2013). The costs associated with
such loss incur in (1) finding the replacement and (2) training new employees (Boyne
et al., 2010; Michele Kacmar et al., 2006; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Watlington et al.,
2010). First, hiring a new employee involves several steps, from announcing a position,
receiving and evaluating applications, and conducting interviews to making a final
decision for the recruitment, all of which impose substantial costs to the organization.
Second, even after the replacement, the organization still needs to invest efforts to train
the newcomer on the organization’s processes and systems. Not only is implementing the
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training costly, but an unnecessary delay in the organizational routine due to a new person
who is not familiar with the existing work can decrease the performance of the
organization. Moreover, the occurrence of turnover destabilizes social network structures
in the workforce, which undermines the organization’s social capital (Dess and Shaw,
2001). In short, employee turnover might have a negative effect on organizational
performance.
The aforementioned costs become even greater when the employee who leaves
the organization is a capable one (Tracey and Hinkin, 2008), because finding a
replacement for a qualified worker is especially challenging. A sector’s job market can be
notorious for searching for a competent job candidate due to a limited supply of quality
labor and the asymmetry of information between future employers and employees (for
more details see, Autor, 2001). Until the organization finds an appropriate replacement,
turnover costs are likely to increase as the organization operates. Furthermore, the costs
of training and adjustment might also be higher given the need to restore significantly
decreased productivity due to the loss of a competent employee. Despite the potential
benefits of having newcomers (as identified in the next section), highly competent
employee turnover would bring about disadvantages to an organization, given the
substantial costs invoked above. In other words, an inverted U-shaped relationship
between turnover and performance (Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017) might not
hold when organizations lose capable workers.
It is important to note that a highly skilled individual’s decision to leave an
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organization is mostly voluntary, as companies always want to retain these employees
(Holland, Sheehan, and De Cieri, 2007; Kyndt et al., 2009). An employee’s intention to
leave an organization and to move to another depends on his or her perception on the ease
of such a transition (March and Simon, 1958; Gerhart, 1990); and needless to say, highly
skilled individuals have more career alternatives (Lee and Mitchell, 1994), which makes
movement much easier. Moreover, individuals who acknowledge their talents and are
passionate about pursuing their career always look for better jobs, and thus are more
likely to voluntarily leave the current organization when they find a more appealing
position for developing their career (Muchinsky and Morrow, 1980; Direnzo and
Greenhaus, 2011). As such, many incidents of voluntary turnover involve losing
employees who have high levels of skills, knowledge, and talent, which can have a linear
and negative effect on organizational performance. Therefore, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between voluntary turnover and organizational
performance will be linear and negative.
3.3.2 Involuntary Turnover and Performance: An Inverted U-Shaped Relationship
From the perspective of cost-benefit theories, turnover should be evaluated based on its
costs imposed to an organization. For instance, instead of spending massive retaining
costs to minimize turnover rates to zero, coping with certain levels of turnover can be a
more cost-efficient way for an organization to manage performance (Dalton and Todor,
1979, 226). Therefore, there may be an optimal level of turnover, and efforts to be close
to the optimal turnover rate can be more net productive than making the rate zero. In a
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similar vein, scholars argue that not all types of turnover are dysfunctional (Dalton and
Todor, 1979). There have been plenty of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
that shows a certain amount of turnover can be beneficial to an organization (see for
example, Abelson and Baysinger, 1984; Dalton, Todor, and Krackhardt, 1982; Meier and
Hicklin, 2008; Siebert and Zubanov, 2009). By firing significantly underperforming
employees, if imposed (involuntary) turnover costs are less than saved retention costs,
organizations can benefit from the action. Considering that hiring processes often fail to
reveal actual labor quality due to their information asymmetries, even carefully selected
employees can underperform after being recruited. Firing such underperforming
employees can remedy these incorrect hiring decisions (Shaw et al., 1998, 512).
Having a certain level of involuntary turnover can be regarded as a reasonable
choice for public organizations. This comes from the fact that involuntary turnover is a
rare event in the public sector due to civil service protection and public managers’
tendency for being risk-averse. Given its rareness, involuntary turnover in a public
agency might be a sign of significantly low performance, since risk-averse public
managers generally tend to avoid wrongful termination lawsuits. In this situation,
dismissal of underperforming employees and replacing them with new, skilled workers
can increase organizational performance (Meier and Hicklin, 2008). Even if a public
organization is not successful in hiring a new worker with a high level of skills and
expertise, by firing a significantly low performing bureaucrat, performance of the
organization can still be enhanced. Involuntary separations can also be used to send
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indirect signals to employees about performance expectations (McElroy, Morrow, and
Rude, 2001, 1294). Considering that job security is one of the key factors that drive
bureaucrats’ decision to enter a public organization (Rainey, 2009), observing layoffs of
colleagues can motivate bureaucrats to work harder.
In summary, firing a poorly-performing employee and hiring a new worker of
average or above average skill level can positively affect organizational performance,
which suggests a positive effect of involuntary turnover on performance (Boyne and
Dahya, 2002; Meier and Hicklin, 2008). When overdone, however, the costs associated
with replacing fired workers can outweigh the benefits. After shedding too many
low-performing personnel, the benefits that managers can achieve by closing the
performance gap between high and underperforming employees will be reduced. Too
much firing can also hurt employee job satisfaction, commitment, and employee morale
(Brockner et al., 2004; Travaglione and Cross, 2006) since employees might have the
impression that they are not being valued in the organization or the organization is
unwilling to invest in their expertise. Thus, after a certain point, extensive downsizing
will have diminishing marginal returns and start to negatively affect the performance of
the organization. Hence, I hypothesize that an inverted-U-relationship proposed by
Abelson and Baysinger (1984) is more suitable for the relationship between involuntary
turnover and organizational performance in public agencies.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between involuntary turnover and organizational
performance will be nonlinear, first positive and then negative.
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Practically speaking, on average voluntary turnover is normally greater in
organizations than involuntary separations (see, Selden and Moynihan, 2000; Shaw et al.,
1998). As is the problem with any composite turnover measure, the actual effect of
involuntary turnover might be hidden when fused with voluntary turnover. If the effect of
voluntary turnover on organizational performance is negative and linear, as stated in
hypothesis 1, then we might expect absolute turnover to have a similar impact on
performance as voluntary turnover. The intention of this hypothesis is to bring a caution
in the use of absolute turnover.
Hypothesis 3. Given the proportion of voluntary and involuntary turnover in the absolute
turnover measure, the relationship between absolute turnover and organizational
performance will be linear and negative.
3.4 Methods and Context
When testing turnover effects, Glebbeek and Bax (2004) suggest using multiple
departments or companies with different rates of turnover, or a department or firm with
several years of data to test the nonlinear relationship between turnover and firm
performance. Data on performance and organizational indicators in similar organizational
settings over multiple years would be ideal for testing the theory and hypotheses (Meier
and Hicklin, 2008); inference on parameters is more accurate in panel data than time
series data (Hsiao, 2007).
In this study I use data from Florida school districts from 2009 to 2012, which are
highly professionalized public organizations with multiple goals, one of which is to
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achieve a high level of student performance. To achieve their varied goals, an elected
school board in each Florida school district implements policy, sets budgets, and
approves expenditures. In Florida schools, teachers are contracted annually and since
2011 newly hired teachers do not have tenure. Furthermore, teachers’ unions in Florida
are the weakest in the nation; teachers do not have the right to strike or bargain
collectively (Winkler, Scull, and Zeehandelaar, 2012). They are less likely to interfere in
the process of hiring and firing teachers in Florida schools.
When we use panel data, we often violate the classical linear model assumptions.
To account for the issues, I employ robust standard errors clustered by school districts
and add year dummy variables with 2009 as the base year. When testing the nonlinear
relationship between organizational turnover and student achievement, I add a quadratic
term for turnover in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. The squared
term, however, can introduce severe collinearity issues in the estimated models; severe
multicollinearity can limit the precision and predictive power of the estimated
relationship between turnover and organizational performance. A solution to this problem
is to use a large sample with substantial variation (Gujarati, 1995, 343). The data set
includes 261 school districts during the four-year period. 261 observations are not few;
however, it is also not too many.2 Thus, I employ the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to
test whether models suffer from severe multicollinearity problems. The VIF test results
allay any concerns of severe multicollinearity in the estimated models.3
2 The number of observations in Meier and Hicklin (2008) are over 4000. Compared to their study, the
261 observations are relatively small.
3 The average VIF ranges between 1.81 and 3.06 in table 3.1, between 3.04 and 4.01 in table 3.2, and
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3.4.1 Data and Measures
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, I collect data from the Florida Department of
Education. All the other variables are pooled from the Florida Department of Education’s
online public database, including teachers’ exit and free and reduced-price lunch
eligibility surveys. These data are derived at school district level and are collected and
openly disseminated for the purpose of accountability. Among the universe of
seventy-four districts, I use sixty-seven Florida public school districts from 2009 to 2012.
I exclude special and lab school districts from my sample. Special and lab school districts
have different organizational goals and preferences in allocating their budgets, and are
therefore not comparable with the rest of public school districts for the purposes of the
current study. For example, lab school districts more often pursue long-term goals than
their public counterparts. Special school districts for challenged students might focus
more on other skills, rather than standard metrics of student performance. The descriptive
statistics are presented in table A1 in Appendix A.
3.4.1.1 Student Performance
Among various school performance indicators, this study employs the FCAT test results
as the main performance measurement. In Florida, students from 3rd to 11th grade take
the FCAT test in math, reading, writing, and science. This is an excellent indicator of
student performance in Florida school districts since most students, including English
between 1.80 and 2.64 in table 3.3, no independent variable yielding greater than the VIF score of 10. Hence,
I conclude that the models do not suffer from severe collinearity.
45
language learners and exceptional education students, participate in this test. To graduate
from high school, 10th-grade students have to meet the minimum requirement in the
FCAT reading and mathematics sections. If lower grade students fail to meet the
standards, they will not be promoted in the following year. Given that FCAT reading and
math tests are the most important subjects to graduate or be promoted, this study uses
percent of students who pass FCAT reading and math tests as the dependent variable.
FCAT scores are also important to schools and parents. Schools in Florida receive
letter grades from A to F based on student FCAT test results. These school grades are
publicly available from the Florida Department of Education for the purpose of
accountability. If parents want, they can access this information and see how students in a
certain district are performing on state standardized tests. These grades are also used in
decision-making about the distribution of funding, which indicates their importance to
schools. In 2012, FCAT changed to FCAT 2.0. The new test includes multiple-choice
questions at all grade levels in the reading and math sections. Gridded-response questions
were also added to math test for grades 4 through 8. These changes are captured in my
models by year fixed effects.
3.4.1.2 Voluntary and Involuntary Turnover
Since the dependent variable is student performance, to measure turnover, I use teacher
turnover instead of all employees in schools. Using production level workers to measure
organizational turnover is common in examining the effect of turnover on organizational
performance (e.g., Alexander, Bloom, and Nuchols, 1994; Dolton and Newson, 2003;
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Glebbeek and Bax, 2004; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2005;
Shaw, Park, and Kim, 2013; Zimmerman et al., 2002).
Defining voluntary turnover can be problematic because sometimes employees are
encouraged to resign but are not fired. For example, the Florida Department of Education
categorizes resignation in lieu of termination as voluntary turnover. To organizations and
employees, this categorization is important because unemployment benefits vary based
on this. The main concern for this study, however, is to determine how each type of
turnover affects student performance, not the benefits that separated employees may
derive. Thus, I consider those employees who resigned in-lieu-of termination as part of
the involuntary turnover count, whom schools do not prefer to employ anymore.4 Schools
in Florida are stipulated to conduct a survey of teachers when they resign or are fired, and
report to the Florida Department of Education annually. These exit surveys are filled out
by outgoing teachers, not by administrators. Survey questions include the specific nature
of teacher turnover, whether the severance was voluntary or involuntary, and the reason(s)
why they resigned or were terminated (see table A2 in Appendix A). When teachers fill
out the survey, they can choose up to five reasons for why they are leaving.
In short, I define voluntary turnover as separation of employees an organization
prefers to keep (Abelson and Baysinger, 1984) and involuntary turnover as the dismissal
of employees unwanted by the organization. Turnover rates in this study indicate the
4 The Florida Department of Education originally considers the resignation in-lieu-of termination cate-
gory as voluntary turnover. The key findings of this study hold regardless of having the category as voluntary
or involuntary. The purpose of the re-categorization is to capture more nuance in the voluntary and involun-
tary turnover measures.
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number of teachers who are voluntarily or involuntarily separating from teaching
positions per total number of teachers in a school district. To measure overall turnover, I
sum both voluntary and involuntary turnover.
The trend in teacher turnover rates in Florida schools is similar to other
governmental and public organizations. For instance, the average voluntary turnover of
all state employees was 8.04 percent in 1997 (Selden and Moynihan, 2000), and the
average involuntary turnover of the employees was 2.94 percent in 2003 (Selden, 2006).
In Florida school districts, highly professionalized organizations, voluntary and
involuntary turnover rates are each 5.58 and 2.08 percent. According to Meier and
Hicklin (2008), turnover rates in over a thousand Texas school districts from 1994 to
2002 was 14.4 percent, including separations due to other reasons such as serious illness
and death. While voluntary and involuntary turnover are the interest of this study, as
compared to broader conceptual models like serious illness or death, when I calculate all
types of teacher turnover in Florida school districts, the turnover rates (voluntary,
involuntary, and other turnover) are 13.66 percent, which is slightly lower than Texas
school districts. In the dataset, about 6 percent of turnover is due to other reasons, such as
death and illness. Since organizations cannot control or influence employee death or
illness, I exclude these turnover rates from the sample.
3.4.1.3 Controls
It is important to consider other factors, besides turnover, that may affect student
performance. Excluding such factors can lead to a spurious relationship. The vast
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literature devoted to the estimation of education production functions has identified
school resources and constraints as key determinants of educational performance (e.g.,
Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine, 1996; Hanushek, 1996). Constraints include race and
poverty. Race and poverty are related to family income levels, health conditions, and
educational materials at home. Racial minority status or low-income status may affect
student performance, since these students generally have relatively limited access to
educational resources compared to their non-minority and non-low income peers. To
capture these effects, the percent of African American, Hispanic, and low-income
students are used as controls. Percentage of low-income students was defined as students
who are eligible for free and reduced price lunch in school districts. As indicators of
resources, I include the student-teacher ratio, the average experience and salary of
teachers, instructional expenditures, and the percentage of classes not being taught by
highly qualified teachers.5 When teachers have more teaching experience and are better
paid or schools distribute more resources toward instruction, we should expect them to
positively influence student performance. In contrast, when class size and the number of
nonqualified teachers increase, student performance should decrease.
3.5 Results
Tables 3.1 and 3.3 include six models; models 1, 2, and 3 use students’ FCAT pass rates
on reading, while models 4, 5, and 6 use FCAT pass rates on math as the dependent
5 In Florida school districts, qualified teachers who teach core courses should at least hold bachelor’s
degree and hold a Florida Temporary or Professional Certificate. Teachers who fail to meet one of those
conditions are considered as not highly qualified.
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variable. In all models, both voluntary and involuntary teacher turnover rates are
included, using the percent of teachers who stay in school districts as the base.6 In
tables 3.1 and 3.3, models 1 and 4 test the linear relationship between teacher turnover
and student performance, models 2 and 5 include the squared term of involuntary teacher
turnover to investigate its nonlinear relationship with student performance on subjects,
and models 3 and 6 estimate autoregressive models adding the lagged dependent variable.
Table 3.1 illustrates the effect of voluntary and involuntary teacher turnover on
FCAT reading and math pass rates. In model 1, voluntary teacher turnover is negatively
associated with student reading test scores (b=-0.198; p<.10); when voluntary teacher
turnover increases by one percent, FCAT reading pass rates would decrease by -0.198
percentage points compared to those who stay at school districts. The negative
relationship between voluntary teacher turnover and student reading pass rates, however,
becomes insignificant when the squared term of involuntary turnover is added (model 2)
and when the autoregressive model is employed (model 3). Models 4, 5, and 6 also show
that the relationship between voluntary teacher turnover and FCAT math pass rates is not
statistically significant.
The results in models 2 and 5 reveal the inverted-U shaped relationship between
FCAT reading and math pass rates and involuntary teacher turnover as hypothesized, first
positive and then negative. The results indicate that involuntary teacher turnover is
positively associated with FCAT reading and math pass rates until a certain point; the
positive effect, however, rapidly diminishes once the involuntary turnover rates exceed
6 Models in table 3.2 will be introduced later in the manuscript.
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the optimal rate.7 Ceteris paribus, the optimal turnover rate can be calculated by taking
the first derivative of this regression equation and setting it equal to zero. This calculation
reveals that the optimal rates of involuntary teacher turnover for FCAT reading and math
pass rates are 6.92% and 5.54% in models 2 and 5, respectively. Considering that the
average involuntary teacher turnover rate in the sample data is 1.96, the average Florida
school district in the sample is operating on the left side of the inverted-U. This indicates
that in models 2 and 5, the average involuntary turnover rates in the sample data is lower
than the optimal rates by 4.96 and 3.58, respectively. With the average point of turnover,
the slopes of the inverted-U curve are +.332 and +.943 in models 2 and 5; although these
points seem small, once school districts move from the midpoints, the effect of
involuntary turnover becomes significant. Figure 3.1 depicts the predicted values of
student reading and math performance at varying levels of involuntary teacher turnover
(other variables held constant at their means), using models 2 and 5 in table 3.1.
Since an average school district in the sample operates on the left side of this
nonlinear curve, an increase in involuntary teacher turnover rates in these schools can
benefit their student performance. Yet, the slope of these curves falls rapidly to reflect a
negative relationship when the turnover rises to the optimal rates of 5.54 for FCAT math
pass rates (on the left of figure 1) and of 6.91 for FCAT reading pass rates (on the right of
figure 1). Models 3 and 6 in table 3.1 provide more robust results controlling for the past
student performance; the nonlinear relationships in these models are more consistent
7 The optimal point in this study indicates a statistical moment where the curve changes its direction.
As a caution, I also note that this may predict well in some situations and not in other contexts. The optimal
rates can be different depending on environmental factors, resources, and cultural norms in organizations.
52
Figure 3.1: Predicted margins of involuntary turnover on student performance
compared to the ones in models 2 and 5.
As advised by Shaw (2011) and Hausknecht and Trevor (2011), I further examine
whether there exists a nonlinear relationship between voluntary teacher turnover and
student performance in math and reading, although this manuscript does not posit the
relationship between the two. Models 1 and 3 in table 3.2 add the squared term of
voluntary teacher turnover to models 2 and 5 in table 3.1, and models 2 and 4 control for
the lagged dependent variable in the two models. The results in model 1 suggest
statistically insignificant relationships between both direct and squared terms of voluntary
(and involuntary) teacher turnover and student performance in reading. When adding the
lagged dependent variable, the linear term of involuntary teacher turnover becomes
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Table 3.2: Testing the nonlinear relationship between voluntary teacher turnover and stu-
dent performance
Dependent variable: Reading Math
FCAT pass rates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Nonlinear AR Nonlinear AR
Voluntary turnover −0.213 −0.152 0.016 0.217+
(0.355) (0.129) (0.445) (0.129)
Voluntary turnover squared 0.002 0.008 −0.014 −0.023+
(0.024) (0.010) (0.031) (0.012)
Involuntary turnover 0.343 0.264+ 0.858∗ 0.392∗∗
(0.241) (0.138) (0.338) (0.118)
Involuntary turnover squared −0.025 −0.028 −0.076∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.034) (0.010)
Lagged student performance 0.849∗∗ 0.913∗∗
(0.057) (0.036)
% Black students −0.172∗∗ −0.004 −0.152∗∗ 0.022
(0.032) (0.012) (0.056) (0.018)
% Hispanic students −0.106∗∗ −0.017 −0.028 0.000
(0.026) (0.013) (0.041) (0.012)
% Low income students −0.383∗∗ −0.064∗∗ −0.363∗∗ −0.043∗
(0.032) (0.024) (0.039) (0.019)
Class size 0.168 0.103 0.262 0.052
(0.338) (0.102) (0.500) (0.154)
Teacher experience 0.112 −0.012 0.159 −0.101
(0.174) (0.078) (0.232) (0.079)
Expenses 000s 0.238 0.385 0.289 0.104
(0.582) (0.250) (0.790) (0.274)
Teacher pay 000s 0.214+ 0.004 0.112 0.022
(0.127) (0.052) (0.173) (0.061)
Noncertified −0.110+ −0.044+ −0.242∗∗ −0.039+
(0.059) (0.025) (0.091) (0.023)
Constant 71.446∗∗ 10.550∗ 75.265∗∗ 6.651
(7.775) (4.040) (11.139) (4.867)
R-Squared 0.854 0.957 0.787 0.948
N 261 259 261 259
Note: +p < 0.10,∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01; clustered robust standard errors by school district
in parenthesis; year fixed effects not shown; AR=Autoregressive.
statistically significant (b=0.264; p<0.10). In model 3, there is no statistically significant
evidence for the nonlinear relationship between voluntary teacher turnover and student
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performance in math, while involuntary teacher turnover shows a nonlinear relationship
with FCAT math pass rates, first positive and then negative. Controlling for the past
performance, model 4 shows the nonlinear relationship of voluntary and involuntary
turnover with student math performance, first positive and then negative; both voluntary
and involuntary teacher turnover have a statistically significant relationship with changes
in student math pass rates.
Table 3.3 estimates the effect of absolute turnover on student performance. In
models 1 and 4 in this table, the relationship between absolute turnover and student
performance in math and reading is not statistically significant. In model 2, both
coefficients on turnover and the squared term of turnover are not statistically significant.
Model 5, however, shows that the squared term of total turnover has a negative sign
(b=-0.015; p<0.05) for FCAT math pass rates. Estimating autoregressive models, the
squared term becomes statistically significant in model 3 and both linear and squared
terms show statistical significances in model 6, first positive and then negative. This
result is opposite of the expectation that voluntary turnover might override the impact of
involuntary turnover when we use the absolute term. Although it is difficult to be sure,
the results in models 3, 5, and 6 seem to be driven by involuntary teacher turnover rather
than by voluntary turnover since these results show a nonlinear relationship; the
relationship between involuntary turnover and student performance might be more
systematic since involuntary turnover may involve more management.
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3.6 Discussions and Conclusions
This chapter examines the nonlinear relationship between teacher turnover and student
performance offering perspectives on voluntary and involuntary turnover. To investigate
the relationship between voluntary and involuntary turnover and student performance,
this study adopts its theory from Mosher and Kingsley (1936) Public Personnel
Administration and private sector literature, and tests it using data collected from Florida
public school districts.
This chapter makes theoretical contributions to the literature on the impact of
turnover on organizational performance. Voluntary turnover implies that employees left
an organization of their own volition. This concept is complicated when some employees,
who leave voluntarily, were actually nudged to leave. By categorizing these employees
separately from the voluntary group, I distinguish employees whom the employer prefers
to retain and those whom the employer does not want. In the context of Florida public
schools, types of turnover are significant predictors to reveal the nonlinear relationship.
The primary findings offer us a key insight that using aggregated turnover measures
(absolute turnover rates) might hide the unique impact of voluntary and involuntary
turnover on performance. Using absolute turnover can lead to misstatements of the true
relationship between organizational performance and organizational turnover.
Findings also yield critical insights on the effect of voluntary and involuntary
turnover on organizational performance, as well as set directions for the future research.
First, involuntary teacher turnover has a nonlinear relationship with student performance
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in math and reading, first positive and then negative, except for model 2 in table 3.2. The
finding aligns with perspectives of cost-benefit theories that a certain level of involuntary
turnover (firing employees who do not perform well) benefit the organization. This also
suggests that studying costs by turnover types can help us better understand the
turnover-performance link. Future research might want to further explore this bifurcation.
I suggest two possibilities. Retirement is categorized as voluntary turnover, considering
early retirement has a choice factor associated with it. Since retirement is more
predictable than other types of turnover, distinguishing it from other types of turnover
may help to disentangle the mechanism of the turnover-performance link. Furthermore,
in this study, reduction-in-force is categorized as involuntary turnover because
organizations can decide whom to keep and whom to let go. From the perspective of cost
mechanisms, one could treat this separately to arrive at a richer perspective of the
turnover-performance link. Also, it will be worthwhile to test the relationship between
types of turnover and performance in other types of professionalized public organizations
or local or federal governments, given that public schools have inputs, processes, and
performance measures that may differ from other public organizations. In the interest of
generalizability, testing the proposed theory in different settings, such as public schools
in different states or entirely different public organizations, will be helpful. A larger data
set would also offer more explicit and robust relationships.
Second, results on the relationship between voluntary turnover and performance
are inconclusive and call for further research. Although all linear terms of voluntary
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turnover in models 1 through 6 in table 3.1 show a negative sign, only model 1 shows a
statistically significant relationship with student performance in reading; however, the
relationship becomes insignificant when adding the squared term of involuntary turnover
or a lagged dependent variable. One result (model 4 in table 3.2) also demonstrates a
possible nonlinear relationship between voluntary teacher turnover and student
performance in FCAT math exams, first positive and then negative. The finding on the
nonlinear relationship resonates with the argument by Moon (2017). In his study, he
explains that given that public organization structures tend to be more stagnant, an influx
of new employees can bring significant positive effects to organizations and help them
revitalize. An investigation of the labor supply in the public sector would help develop a
more robust understanding of the voluntary turnover and organizational performance
relationship.
In conclusion, this study provides public managers with a critical lesson regarding
strategic management and personnel recruitment and retention; all types of turnover are
not necessarily bad, and thus turnover should be managed (not minimized) based on its
types. As shown in the nonlinear relationship between involuntary teacher turnover and
student performance, public managers can improve student performance by firing or
laying off significantly underperforming teachers. Replacing such employees can benefit
the organizations. However, if managers lay off employees aggressively, the initial spike
in student performance after a certain point will be counteracted by a rapid decline in
performance; the cost of replacing too many workers may override the benefits derived
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from firing some underperforming workers. Public managers should be aware of the
tradeoff between removing significantly underperforming employees and the transaction
costs of replacing them.
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4. GOVERNING BOARD TURNOVER IN NONPROFITS: EXAMINING THE
EFFECTS OF GOVERNING BOARD TURNOVER IN UNITED WAY ON
NONPROFIT FINANCIAL CAPACITY
4.1 Introduction
Nonprofit organizations – like public agencies and private firms – are profoundly affected
by the occurrence of turnover (Jamison, 2003; Selden and Sowa, 2015). Especially, given
that human resources play an even more critical role in nonprofits whose work is labor
intensive (Pynes, 2008), the dearth of studies that examine the turnover-performance link
in nonprofit organizations is surprising. This chapter investigates the relationship
between turnover and performance in the context of nonprofit organizations. More
specifically, I adopt turnover theories from public and business management literature,
develop a theory of governing board turnover in nonprofits, and empirically examine its
relationship with nonprofit performance.
While the performance of nonprofits is difficult to accurately evaluate (Sawhill
and Williamson, 2001) due to its multi-dimensional nature (Brown, Andersson, and Jo,
2016; Forbes, 1998), scholars generally emphasize the importance of financial capacity
(Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003; Bowman, 2011) as a key dimension of organizational
performance, since organizational power comes from the ability to extract resources from
the environment. Nonprofits conduct various activities and provide a range of services
that align with their mission; needless to say, all of these requires sufficient amount of
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financial resources. The acquisition of sufficient resources is essential for any
organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) as the ability for doing so is related to
organizational power (Meier, 1980; Rourke, 1976). It is even more critical for nonprofits
who generally lack their own revenue-generating capacity (Froelich, 1999). Moreover,
looking at financial capacity is a generalized method to assess the performance of many
different types of nonprofits who pursue their own missions (Eckerd and Moulton, 2011).
For these reasons, financial capacity has been received attention from both scholars and
practitioners of nonprofit management (Eckerd and Moulton, 2011; Prentice, 2016;
Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003).
Nonprofits’ governing board can have significant effects on the financial capacity
of the organization in that the board members play critical roles in attracting and utilizing
resources needed to operate various programs (Ott and Dicke, 2016). Board members act
as boundary spanners (Miller-Millesen, 2003) who bring and sustain networks of
potential funders, which help with the acquisition of financial resources (Hager, Rooney,
and Pollak, 2002), as hypothesized in the resource dependence theory (Brown, 2005). In
addition, the board members play an oversight role, ensuring that the executives’
decisions of utilizing resources resonate with the pursuit of organizational missions
(Brown, 2005; Miller, 2002) from the perspective of agency theory (Miller-Millesen,
2003). Therefore, the attributes of nonprofit board and the organization’s financial
capacity, especially with regard to the acquisition and utilization of financial resources,
are closely related (Brown, 2005, 2007; Green and Griesinger, 1996; Herman and Renz,
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2000; Preston and Brown, 2004). Yet, the consequences of turnover occurring in the
nonprofit governing board on organizational financial capacity, despite its importance,
has been understudied. Most of the previous research on the relationship between the two
has been conducted in the context of private firms (Daily and Dalton, 1995; Kaplan,
1993) whose organizational missions and goals are markedly different from nonprofits.
Using the data on United Way (UW) organizations, this chapter investigates the
effects of nonprofit governing board turnover on the performance of organizations,
specifically in terms the financial capacity. To this end, the chapter proceeds as follows.
First, I briefly explain the challenges of measuring nonprofit performance and then
emphasize the importance of financial capacity as performance indicators. Second, I
discuss how members of nonprofit governing boards contribute to promoting the
nonprofit financial capacity, using the perspectives from resource dependence theory and
agency theory. Third, I apply the theories on turnover and performance in the context of
nonprofit management and develop hypotheses to be tested. Fourth, I provide
explanations on data, variables, and analysis method. The next section presents analysis
results with interpretations. I conclude with discussing implications, contributions, as
well as limitations of this chapter.
4.2 Assessing Nonprofit Performance: Focusing on the Financial Capacity
The performance of nonprofit organizations is difficult to measure (Sawhill and
Williamson, 2001) in that it is multidimensional in nature (Brown, Andersson, and Jo,
2016; Forbes, 1998; Sowa, Selden, and Sandfort, 2004) and that different organizations
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pursue different missions (Kaplan, 2001). Thus, one single measure for nonprofit
performance does not exist in the literature; rather, scholars have used a variety of
measures according to their research contexts and objectives. Lee and Nowell (2015)
present a framework for assessing nonprofit performance that incorporates a variety of
performance dimensions, along with specific measures for each dimension that have been
used in previous studies. According to the framework, organizational capacity is a key
performance dimension that shows “how well a nonprofit has constructed effective
internal process and structures to use the resources efficiently and effectively toward the
advancement of the organization’s mission” (305). It plays a critical role in producing
outputs that would eventually help the organization’s effort to accomplish its mission and
to create public values, and could, therefore, be used as a good proxy for judging the
nonprofit performance.
While organizational capacity itself is also a broad term that encompasses many
different attributes (Brown, Andersson, and Jo, 2016; Sowa, Selden, and Sandfort, 2004),
many nonprofit scholars have studied financial capacity (Bowman, 2011; Carroll and
Stater, 2008; Chikoto and Neely, 2014); it is a generalized measure for evaluating the
performance of many different types of nonprofits with different organizational missions
(Eckerd and Moulton, 2011), which has an advantage for empirical testing. Furthermore,
financial capacity is a critical element of nonprofit performance, as it represents “the
resources that give an organization the wherewithal to seize opportunities and react the
unexpected threat” (Bowman, 2011, 38). Financial capacity is also important in that it
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allows for the development of other capacity dimensions (AbouAssi and Jo, 2017), such
as human resources capacity, managerial capacity, capacity for learning and innovation,
since all of the organizational activities for capacity-building require sufficient financial
resources (Brown, Andersson, and Jo, 2016). Furthermore, external environmental forces
make nonprofits’ financial capacity even more important in the recent years. The
economic recession in 2008 has resulted in a substantial decrease in donations to
nonprofit organizations (Salamon, Geller, and Spence, 2009), while at the same time the
demands for nonprofits to provide social services have increased (Calabrese, 2011;
Chikoto and Neely, 2014). Thus, financial capacity of nonprofits has been highlighted in
both research and practice of nonprofit management. Following the perspectives, this
paper focuses on nonprofits’ financial capacity and examines how it is affected by
nonprofit governing board turnover. Accordingly, the following section presents what
roles nonprofit board member turnover play in developing nonprofits’ financial capacity.
4.3 The Roles of Governing Board Members in Nonprofit Organizations
Nonprofit organizations are operated through a system of governance, which is “the
function of oversight that a group of people assumes when they incorporate under the
laws of a state for an organizational purpose that qualifies for nonprofit status” (Ott and
Dicke, 2016, 2). Scholars have conflicting views on how to define nonprofit governance;
whether it should refer to the function of the board of directors or should broadly
incorporate the strategic leadership of nonprofits that are associated with executives’
management decisions (Chait, Ryan, and Taylor, 2011; Cornforth, 2012). Regardless of
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taking either perspective, the role of nonprofit board is quite substantial, as it has the final
authority on nonprofits’ governing decisions (Jackson and Fogarty, 2005, 30; Ott and
Dicke, 2016, 2; Widmer, 1993, 344).
Moreover, the importance of nonprofit governing board in managing the
organization is pretty obvious when considering its specific roles. Block (1998, 9)
summarizes nonprofit governing board’s roles in mainly nine ways: 1) determination of
organizational mission; 2) establishment of policies and plans for the operation of the
organization; 3) activities related to the organization’s finance, including budget approval,
development of financial controls and fiscal policies; 4) resources acquisition activities,
such as fundraising and setting the goals of resources development; 5) networking
activities to enhance the organization’s visibility in the community; 6) help with ensuring
the corporate documents of the organization to be updated and the required reports to be
filed; 7) recruitment and selection of new board members and help them learn about the
board’s activities; 8) activities related to serving as a “principal” for the organization’s
executive director (i.e. recruiting, assessing, rewarding, and terminating the executive
when necessary); and 9) protection of the organization’s status being nonprofit and
tax-exempt. In short, the board of directors is, and should be, involved in almost all
stages of managing nonprofit organizations. Therefore, the well-performing board is a
key to enhance and sustain the performance of nonprofit organizations in general (Brown,
2005; Brown, Andersson, and Jo, 2016; Green and Griesinger, 1996; Harris, 2014), as
well as the dimension of financial capacity more specifically (Brown, 2005).
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Several helpful organization theories provide insights on the linkage between the
performance of the governing board and financial capacity of nonprofits, focusing on the
roles of nonprofit board members. Notably, the perspectives from resource dependence
theory and agency theory prevail (Brown, 2005; Herman and Renz, 2008;
Miller-Millesen, 2003). These theories explain how nonprofit governing board
contributes to the two critical components of the organization’s financial capacity, namely
“acquisition” and “utilization” of financial resources (Lee and Nowell, 2015, 305).
First, resource dependence theory argues that nonprofit board members are the
vital asset of a nonprofit that connects the organization with its external environment
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Malatesta and Smith, 2014). To be specific, nonprofit board
members act as boundary spanners who increase networks of the organization, and also
serve as ambassadors of the organization who promote the organization’s reputation in
the community and the broader society (Miller-Millesen, 2003). Both of these activities
can significantly increase the organization’s ability to acquire resources from existing and
potential funders in the external environment, which in turn contributes to the
organization’s financial capacity.
Second, agency theory postulates the relationship between the nonprofit
governing board and the executive director(s) as a principal-agent relationship (Brown,
2005; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003). In this sense, the governing
board can be regarded as an oversight mechanism that controls the executives. The main
responsibility is to ensure whether the executives make and implement decisions that
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appropriately serve the interests of stakeholders and pursue organizational missions
(Miller, 2002). For doing so, board members establish the criteria for evaluating program
plans and monitor the executives’ decisions for allocating resources to different programs
(Miller-Millesen, 2003). Therefore, nonprofit governing boards help with the
organization’s efforts to spend its financial resources in a way that it prioritizes
organizational activities to the pursuit of the mission. This ultimately boosts the
organization’s capacity to better utilize its financial resources.
To sum up, members of the nonprofit governing board play an essential role in
building and sustaining nonprofits’ financial capacity, especially in terms of its ability to
attract and utilize financial resources for the operation of the organization. Given the
arguments above, the occurrence of turnover in the governing board should affect the
financial capacity, and ultimately have an impact on the performance of the organization.
The following section discusses the effect of governing board turnover on nonprofit
performance and presents a hypothesis to be tested in this paper.
4.4 The Effects of Board Member Turnover on Nonprofit Financial Capacity
Like any other organizations, governing board turnover is a common phenomenon in
nonprofit organizations. Traditionally, studies from both fields of public and business
management argue that turnover can be disruptive since organizations are exposed to
sudden changes that can negatively affect the current functions of an organization. This
argument focuses on the importance of organizational stability and routinization in
reducing the risk of failure, and therefore, ensuring high-performance (Haveman, 1992,
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50). Throughout its stages of growth, organizations tend to develop and routinize a set of
strategies, activities, and processes; once they reach the “structural inertia,” any change
happening with regard to goals, policies, and rules can be viewed as harmful (Hannan and
Freeman, 1984).
Following the same logic, governing board turnover can result in bad
consequences on nonprofit financial capacity. First, from the agency theory perspective, a
new governing board member may want to represent a different set of community interest
(Miller, 2002), being the principal who has a set of priorities that can differ the current
ones in the organization. This can cause turbulence to pre-existing fiscal policies and
fund development strategies and confusion among management staff about how to utilize
financial resources and conduct fundraising activities. Second, governing board turnover
can be a loss from the view of resource dependence theory. Each board member is a
boundary spanner who connects the organization with a unique set of resources networks
in the external environment (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003).
Therefore, the occurrence of governing board turnover indicates a decrease in the
potential pools of financial resources (see examples from corporate governing boards,
Denis and Denis, 1995; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). In sum, governing board turnover
breaks organizational stability in terms of resources utilization and acquisition, thereby
negatively affecting nonprofits’ financial capacity.
One, however, can argue that turnover is not necessarily a bad phenomenon,
because it prevents an organization from resisting changes and innovation that are
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beneficial to organizational performance (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). To illustrate, after
a certain point of organizational expansion and growth, organizations often experience
some types of red tape that make them less flexible, slow, and inefficient (Bernstein,
2015; Downs, 1967). This is based on an assumption that an organization does not want
to pursue changes to the current practices when it reaches the stage of structural inertia
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The failure to pursue organizational innovation and to
swiftly adapt to environmental forces can undermine the performance of nonprofit
organizations.
In this regard, governing board turnover may have some positive effects on
nonprofits’ financial capacity, especially if the turnover brings about a positive
organizational change. Resource dependence theory offers valuable insights into this
mechanism. Having a new governing board member who is equipped with a new set of
knowledge, expertise, and background means an increase in critical resources of the
organization. The new members can offer useful advice that could not be made by
existing board members who have been involved in the organization for a long time and
have been deeply adjusted to routinized organizational processes. For instance, the
current members may have stuck to ineffective fundraising strategies that do not work in
a new environment or may have allocated resources to the programs that are not helpful
for meeting the needs of their clients and organizational missions. Furthermore, even if
current board members have been successful in their job, at some point, they might
exhaust their potential fundraising contacts. In those situations, the governing board
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turnover can function as a beneficial organizational change that leads to better utilization
and acquisition of financial resources, which can, in turn, increase nonprofits’ financial
capacity.
Given both sides of arguments, turnover in the governing board can have
advantages and disadvantages in terms of nonprofits’ financial capacity, and its effects are
not simply positive or negative. I would posit that the relationship is likely to be
nonlinear, first positive and then negative. As Wright and Millesen (2008, 323) put, board
members are voluntary workers who often are not assumed to take significant roles in
managing the organization; therefore, the costs of turnover may not be a great deal at the
low level of turnover, as the organization can maintain its normal operations. At the same
time, the organization starts to benefit from the occurrence of turnover, because a new
member who is usually a professional in their field can immediately offer knowledge and
expertise in better utilizing and acquiring financial resources based on their experiences,
background, and network. In other words, the benefits outweigh the costs when the level
of governing board turnover is low. However, if the turnover takes place frequently, the
hypothesized bad consequences of turnover – such as confusion in financial management
due to multiple principals and the loss of existing resources networks – become salient,
which significantly increases the costs of turnover. In short, after a certain point of
governing board turnover (i.e. an optimal level of turnover), the financial capacity of a
nonprofit organization can be undermined. Based on the aforementioned mechanisms, I
hypothesize:
71
Hypothesis: Nonprofit governing board member turnover will have an inverted-U shaped
relationship with the organizational financial capacity, first positive and then negative.
4.5 Data and Methods
To examine the effects of governing board turnover rates on nonprofit financial capacity,
this chapter uses the data on UW organizations, as well as the characteristics of
communities where the UW organizations operate. I collect the data using the multiple
sources: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 990 electronic filer database in 2013 and 2014,
IRS 990 digitized forms in 2014, American Community Survey 5-year estimates between
2010 and 2014. First, I obtain nonprofit financial capacity measures as well as
organizational characteristics from 990 digitized forms. Second, county-level variables
that capture community characteristics are from American Community Survey. Third, the
list of governing board member names is available in the 990 electronic filer database,
which serves as a base for the governing board turnover rates. In 2013 and 2014,
approximately 53 percent of nonprofit organizations filed their tax forms through
electronic filing. Initially, I obtain 780 UW organizations from the IRS efiler database.
While merging the data with IRS 990 digitized forms, 254 observations are excluded,
which means that the 254 UW organizations did not file their tax forms through the
regular means. Excluding observations with less than three governing board members1
and no financial information, the total number of observations is 518.
1The substantive results remain the same whether or not I exclude these observations. I exclude ob-
servations with less than three governing board members since most states require at least three governing
board members to start a nonprofit.
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I employ quadratic regression models to investigate the nonlinear relationship
between governing board turnover and nonprofit financial capacity. In doing so, I add a
quadratic term of governing board member turnover rates. In a quadratic regression
model, severe multicollinearity often becomes a problem since it biases estimated
standard errors. The results from Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), however, suggest that
the set of models in this chapter does not suffer from severe multicollinearity.2 Lastly, to
ensure the results are not driven by the previous year’s nonprofit financial capacity, I
include a lagged dependent variable for each set of models as a robustness check.
4.6 Variables
4.6.1 Dependent Variables
As a proxy for nonprofit financial capacity, I employ two dependent variables–total
contributions and total allocations toward partner nonprofits. Testing the effects of
governing board turnover on multiple dimensions of nonprofit financial capacity is
important since governing board turnover may have a different effect on each dimension
(Kaplan, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995, for more details see examples from the
private sector,). The two variables, total contributions and allocations, capture important
dimensions of nonprofit financial capacity – resource acquisition and utilization – as
explained in the sections on theories above (Lee and Nowell, 2015). Given that governing
board members play an important role in promoting donations and accomplishing goals
and missions of nonprofits through setting policies (Brown and Guo, 2010), the two
2The average VIF is 2.92 for the contribution models and 2.87 for the allocation models.
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particular financial capacity variables are critical when investigating the impact of
governing board member turnover on nonprofit financial capacity. Since both variables
(the amounts of total contributions and total allocations, in USD) are highly skewed to the
right, I have log-transformed both.
4.6.2 Key Independent Variable
Governing board member turnover rates are the key independent variable. I create the
governing board turnover rates by matching names between two time periods – in 2013
and 2014. I first obtain all governing board names from 990 forms listed in efilers
between tax year 2013 and 2014. As a next step, I remove all titles associated with names
and only keep voluntary governing board members.3 Second, using the Stata package
‘matchit,’ I create the Jaccard similarity coefficient of the list of governing board member
names between the two time periods; the matchit command splits words into grams of
two moving characters and then calculate the similarity index. Third, except for the exact
match of names between the two time periods, I manually check all observations with a
similar score higher than 0.5, making sure whether or not names are an actual match.
Going through this process, I have found more exact matches of the names. To illustrate,
Bob and Robert or Bill and William are initially coded as unmatched, which has been
corrected after the manual checking. There also exist human coding errors in the list of
governing board member names, which has also been fixed. Fourth, with the number of
3In the list of governing board member names, it includes key officers and employees in addition to gov-
erning board members. Since many nonprofits use different titles for key officers and employees, to safely
exclude them all, I only keep governing board members who are not compensated by UW organizations–
voluntary governing board members.
74
matches and total governing board members, I calculate the governing board turnover
rates. The formula for doing so is:
Governing board member turnover rates=
Total number of board members in 2013−board name matches between 2013 and 2014
Total number of board members in 2013
Holding the board size in 2013, the measure successfully excludes any new board
members that might have joined in 2014. In this regard, this measure is distinct from
changes in governing board size and appropriately captures turnover rates of governing
board members. A downside of this measure, however, is that it does not capture name
changes. For instance, if a governing board member changes her/his name due to
marriage or any other reason, this metrics would count those as turnover.4
4.6.3 Controls
I include controls that capture both organizational and community characteristics. For
organizational characteristics, I use the total amount of fundraising expenditures and
program revenues including dues. Both controls are commonly used in the previous
studies on nonprofit financial capacity (e.g., Frumkin and Kim, 2001; Harris and Ruth,
2015). Due to the high skewness of the measures, I transform both into logarithms.
I also account for community characteristics (at the county level) that can affect
4 I have also created another measure of governing board turnover, splitting all names by words and
matching those split names by using regular expressions. The correlation coefficient of the two measures is
0.98 and the substantive results do not differ between the two measures. I use the one created via ‘matchit’
since it is more timely efficient.
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nonprofit financial capacity, such as percent of people with bachelor’s degree, size of the
community (population, logged), and indicators of community wealth (median family
income, logged; percent of unemployment). While the operations of many nonprofits are
conducted across multiple geographical areas, counties still serve as an important
boundary for economic and social activities of nonprofits (Paarlberg et al., 2018; Polson,
2017); hence, the county characteristics need to be controlled in the context of this study.
Summary statistics of all variables included in this chapter is presented in table 4.1. A
histogram of governing board turnover rates is also depicted in figure B.1 in Appendix B.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Total contributions, logged 518 13.53 1.76 0 18.6
Total allocations, logged 453 13.3 1.7 0 18.47
Key independent variable
Governing board turnover 518 22.24 15.06 0 80
Organizational characteristics
Fundraising expenditures, logged 518 3.22 4.61 0 13.21
Program revenues, logged 518 2.97 4.82 0 16.64
Community characteristics
Median family income, logged 518 11.02 .19 10.4 11.78
Population, logged 518 11.61 1.11 8.84 16.12
% Bachelor’s degree 518 15.1 4.77 5.01 38.23
% Unemployement 518 5.21 1.3 .89 9.88
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4.7 Results
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 include three models. Model 1 tests a linear relationship between
nonprofit financial capacity and governing board turnover rates. Model 2 adds a squared
term of governing board turnover rates. Model 3 lastly includes a lagged dependent
variable as a robustness check.
Table 4.2: The effects of governing board turnover rates on total contributions
Dependent variable: Total contributions, logged
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Linear Nonlinear AR
Governing board turnover 0.008+ 0.042∗∗ 0.023+
(0.004) (0.014) (0.012)
Governing board turnover squared −0.001∗∗ −0.000+
(0.000) (0.000)
L. Contributions, logged 0.723∗∗
(0.133)
Fundraising expenditures, logged 0.038∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
Program revenues, logged 0.041∗ 0.042∗ 0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015)
Median family income, logged 0.146 0.123 −0.101
(0.432) (0.427) (0.143)
Population, logged 0.752∗∗ 0.740∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.101)
% Bachelor’s degree 0.009 0.009 −0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.005)
% Unemployement −0.111∗ −0.109∗ −0.060∗
(0.049) (0.048) (0.026)
Constant 3.191 3.290 2.583
(4.667) (4.617) (1.858)
R-Squared overall 0.266 0.280 0.710
N 518 518 515
Note: +p < 0.10,∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parenthesis;
AR=Autoregressive.
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Table 4.2 shows the effects of governing board turnover rates in UW
organizations on total contributions (logged). In model 1, governing board turnover rates
are positively associated with total contributions (b=0.008; p<0.10). A one percent
increase in governing board turnover rates is more likely to increase the total
contributions by 0.8 percent. The next model investigates a potential nonlinear
relationship between the two. To conclude an inverted-U shaped relationship as
hypothesized, both linear and squared terms of governing board turnover rates must be
statistically significant in the model. The results in model 2 show that both terms of
governing board turnover rates are statistically significant. When governing board
turnover occurs, it initially has a positive effect on the amount of total contribution
(b=0.027; p<0.01). Yet, after a certain point, excessive governing board turnover would
start damaging nonprofits’ total contribution, financial resources acquired from the
external environment (b=0.001; p<0.01). Ceteris paribus, by taking the first derivative of
the equation, I can calculate the optimal governing board member turnover rates in UW
organizations in the sample. The optimal governing board turnover rates for total
contributions, derived from model 2, are about 34 percent. Figure 4.1 further elaborates
the relationship and depicts the optimal turnover rates calculated via Model 2.
As shown in Figure 4.1, governing board member turnover rates and total
contributions have an inverted-U shaped relationship, first positive and then negative.
This provides strong support for the hypothesis. To illustrate, when governing turnover
occurs up to a certain point, UW organizations are more likely to gain more contributions.
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Figure 4.1: Predicted margins of governing board turnover rates on total contributions
(logged)
As soon as governing board turnover rates exceed 34 percent in our sample, however,
contributions are more likely to decrease; the slope for governing board turnover quickly
drops after it passes the optimal point. Since the mean of governing board turnover rates
in our sample are about 22 percent, UW organizations are functioning on the left side of
the inverted-U curve and they can benefit from replacing some governing board members.
In model 3, the lagged variable of total contributions is included to ensure the
results are not driven by the function of the previous year’s values. The key results that
show an inverted-U shaped relationship between governing board turnover rates and total
contributions still remain the same, after controlling for the lagged dependent variable,
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which suggests that the hypothesized nonlinear effect of the governing board turnover on
nonprofits’ financial capacity, in terms of the total amount of contributions, is quite
robust.
Table 4.3: The effects of governing board turnover rates on total allocations toward partner
nonprofits
Dependent variable: Total allocations, logged
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Linear Nonlinear AR
Governing board turnover 0.003 0.027∗∗ −0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Governing board turnover squared −0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
L. Total allocations, logged 1.021∗∗
(0.037)
Fundraising expenditures, logged 0.009 0.008 −0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
Program revenues, logged 0.064∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.003)
Median family income, logged 0.002 −0.035 −0.151
(0.573) (0.568) (0.292)
Population, logged 0.944∗∗ 0.937∗∗ 0.013
(0.071) (0.071) (0.021)
% Bachelor’s degree 0.025∗ 0.025∗ 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
% Unemployement −0.169∗∗ −0.172∗∗ −0.028
(0.055) (0.054) (0.022)
Constant 2.539 2.828 1.258
(6.120) (6.072) (2.977)
R-Squared overall 0.403 0.411 0.853
N 453 453 446
Note: +p < 0.10,∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parenthesis;
AR=Autoregressive.
Table 4.3 employs another financial capacity measure of UW organization, total
allocations toward partner nonprofit organizations (logged; hereafter total allocations).
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Model 1 shows no statistically significant linear relationship between governing board
member turnover rates and total allocations. Yet, since this chapter posits a nonlinear
relationship between the two, it will be premature to conclude no relationship unless
testing the nonlinear relationship. Model 2 suggests an inverted-U shaped relationship
between the two. In other words, governing board turnover rates would increase total
allocation toward partner nonprofit organizations initially (b=0.027; p<0.01). Once the
turnover rates exceed a certain point, however, it will start decreasing total amount of
resources being allocated to partner nonprofits (b=-0.0004; p<0.01). Holding all other
variables constant, the calculation of optimal governing board turnover rates for total
allocation shows about 30 percent. Figure 4.2 presents the relationship graphically using
model 2.
Figure 4.2 depicts an inverted-U shaped relationship between governing board
turnover and total allocations. To illustrate, governing board turnover rates would
increase the total amount of resources allocated toward partner organizations, initially. As
soon as the turnover rates go over 30 percent, the slop quickly changes to the decreasing
rate. Given that the mean of governing board turnover rates in the sample (22.26 percent)
is lower than the optimal turnover rates, there is still a room for better managing
governing board member turnover for UW organizations. In other words, once a
governing board member leaves, a newly joined board member (the replacement of the
leaver) may allocate more resources to UW partner nonprofits to push their agenda
further.
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Figure 4.2: Predicted margins of governing board turnover rates on total allocations toward
partner nonprofits (logged)
The inverted-U shaped relationship, however, disappears in model 3 when
controlling for the total allocation in the previous year. Given that the lagged dependent
variable is statistically significant and that both governing board turnover rates and its
squared term are not in the model, governing board turnover might have a long-term
effect on total allocation rather than short-term.
4.8 Discussions and Conclusions
To sum up, I generally find support for the hypothesis on the nonlinear relationship
between the governing board turnover and nonprofits’ financial capacity. The results
suggest that governing turnover rates increases the amounts of total contributions and
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allocations up to a certain point, after which starts to decrease the amounts of both. It is
worth noting that such inverted U-shaped relationship remains significant only for the
total amount of contributions after controlling for the previous year’s values. This
indicates that the nonlinear relationship between governing board turnover and
nonprofits’ financial capacity holds for both in the short and long term in terms of the
resources that the organization attract from the external funders (total contributions). The
nonlinear relationship, however, may only hold in the long term with regard to the
resources that are utilized for serving various organizational purposes (total allocations).
These results provide key implications on how to manage the governing board turnover to
improve the two aspects of nonprofits’ financial capacity: resources acquisition and
utilization.
First, having a certain level of governing board turnover helps with the efforts of
nonprofit organizations to attract financial resources – immediately and also in the long
run – as indicated by the results from the model on total contributions. A key in this
mechanism is that each board member is a unique set of organizational assets that an
organization can rely on for obtaining financial resources, which is expected from the
resource dependence theory (Brown, 2005; Miller-Millesen, 2003). A new board member
brings a different set of expertise and knowledge to the organization that can improve the
organization’s effectiveness in fundraising, and also links the organization with a new set
of networks that can be potential funders of the organization. It is worth noting that the
network they bring in and the advice they give come from their professional experiences
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rather than their knowledge about the organization, which is a type of knowledge that
takes some time for the new member to learn about. Hence, the positive effects of having
governing board turnover appear pretty quickly, in terms of nonprofits’ financial capacity
in acquiring resources from the external environment.
Second, governing board turnover has the same inverted-U shaped relationship
with another dimension of nonprofit financial capacity – the ability to utilize and allocate
financial resources – but perhaps only in the long term. This seems plausible given the
challenges associated with a new board member’s participation in decisions of allocating
financial resources to organizational programs. To make judgment and offer advice about
utilizing and managing resources, the board members should be equipped with necessary
knowledge about the organization itself – including the scope and range of services
provided, different organizational activities, the current managerial practices,
organizational rules and procedures, among others – as well as her or his expected roles
in the organization (Wright and Millesen, 2008). All of these cannot be learned in the
short term, and only after the new board member accumulates the organization-specific
knowledge, she or he can make significant contributions to the improvement of the
organization’s capacity in utilizing resources. This explains the insignificant nonlinear
effect of governing board turnover on the total amount of resources allocated to partner
organizations who serve UW mission with the inclusion of the lagged value of total
allocations.
Lastly, the costs of turnover keep increasing as the turnover rates increases, and
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after a certain rate of turnover, the benefits of having a new member cannot positively
affect the organization’s financial capacity any longer in both cases – attracting and
utilizing financial resources. Too frequent turnover brings multiple principals who
represent different sets of interests and may offer conflicting advice for the organization,
as suggested by the agency theory (Herman and Renz, 2008; Miller, 2002), which in turn
can cause confusion and buffering in making and implementing key managerial
decisions; thus, it is important to maintain the turnover rates in the governing board up to
a certain point and put some efforts to prevent a high level of turnover occurring in the
board, in order to make and sustain a financially capable nonprofit organization.
Yet, the study is not without limitations. First, governing board turnover rates
could be slightly inflated since I could not account for name changes. Second, since I use
the overall turnover measures, it does not capture whether governing board members are
voluntarily left or forced to go out. Those different turnover types may have a different
effect on nonprofit financial performance. I also encourage other scholars to examine this
issue in other types of nonprofits and test the effects of governing board turnover rates on
other types of nonprofit performance. Under what conditions the inverted-U shaped
relationship would hold would be an interesting topic for nonprofit studies. Nevertheless,
the study is among the first attempts to test the nonlinear relationship between governing
board turnover and nonprofits’ financial capacity. Findings from this study, therefore, add
valuable insights to the growing knowledge base on the human resources management
and capacity building in nonprofit organizations.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Introduction
Turnover-performance relationship has been an enduring research topic for organizational
scholars, in the fields of public, private, and nonprofit management. The occurrence of
turnover is unavoidable in any organization; therefore, understanding the dynamics of
turnover is necessary for scholars and practitioners in any field. While the turnover is a
universal phenomenon across different fields, understanding the causes and consequences
of turnover, as well as managerial practices to deal with turnover, could differ across
different fields and different types of organizations. Yet, both the theoretical investigation
and empirical testing have been mostly conducted in the context of private firms. This
dissertation aims to address such gap in public and nonprofit management literature, and
add knowledge to growing theory and evidence base on turnover and organizational
performance in the context of public and nonprofit organizations.
Using the three-paper model, I first develop a theory on optimal turnover rates and
the relationship between turnover and performance incorporating labor market conditions
and the quality of employees (Chapter 2), and then test the turnover-performance
relationship in public organizations (Chapter 3), and in nonprofit organizations (Chapter
4). Key findings from the dissertation are at least three-fold. First, optimal turnover rates
may exist in any organization, which is not necessarily close to zero. This indicates a
potential nonlinear relationship between turnover and organizational performance.
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Second, labor market conditions and the quality of employees in the organization should
be considered in understanding the optimal turnover rates and the turnover-performance
link. Third, organizations in different sectors can have different optimal turnover rates,
and therefore, exhibit different turnover-performance relationships. This is largely due to
the differences between public/nonprofit organizations and business firms, in terms of
such factors as the labor market conditions, employee characteristics, organizational
system, and managerial tools to hire and retain employees.
Previous empirical studies in public and nonprofit management have by and large
focused on factors that are internal to organizations in examining the effects of turnover
on organizational performance; these include characteristics of employees, organizations,
and managerial practices. In other words, labor market conditions – factors related to the
external environment – have largely been ignored in testing the turnover-performance
link. Chapters 3 and 4 in this dissertation also could not incorporate labor supply and
demand in the empirical analyses. In this concluding chapter, therefore, I will re-examine
findings from these two chapters considering the conditions of public and nonprofit
sectors’ labor markets.
5.2 Labor Market Conditions and the Turnover-Performance Link in Public and
Nonprofit Organizations
In Chapters 3 and 4, turnover and organizational performance exhibit an inverted-U
shaped relationship; specifically, (involuntary) teacher and governing board member
turnover have the nonlinear effect on student performance in math and reading and
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nonprofit financial capacity, respectively, first positive and then negative. I also found that
the average turnover rates of teachers and governing board member rates in my samples
(i.e. Florida school districts and UW organizations) are below the optimal turnover rates.
This indicates that the organizations in the sample might have been functioning
inefficiently and that they can benefit from an occurrence of turnover. Though
organizations can improve organizational performance once turnover occurs, inefficient
operations of the organizations would seem to be irrational at the first glance. Yet, these
managerial decisions may have been a strategic choice, not necessarily managers’
negligence on organizational inefficiency, especially if we take the conditions associated
with labor markets for public schools and nonprofit organizations into consideration.
Table 5.1: Changes in labor market conditions and turnover gains
∆ Labor market conditions Qn Turnover costs Turnover gains
Labor supply ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
Labor supply ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓
Labor demand ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Labor demand ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Note: Qn=Quality of new employees; Turnover costs=f(costs of
recruitment, costs of training, costs of learning).
Table 5.1 summarizes the relationship between labor market conditions and
turnover gains from Chapter 2. Given that public schools in the United States face a great
level of teacher shortage (i.e. a low level of labor supply), the expected gains from
teacher turnover are likely to be small. Furthermore, a limited labor supply also increases
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uncertainty in finding a suitable replacement after an occurrence of turnover. In this case,
public managers might be better off by focusing on keeping turnover rates low rather than
trying to achieve the optimal turnover rates. When the issue is coupled with a high level
of labor demand, the managers may need to take a more conservative approach in
managing turnover. Suppose that a math teacher in a public school is shirking. Since it is
very difficult to find a math teacher with a high level of skills and the demand for skilled
math teachers is higher than teachers for other subjects, even if the teacher is
underperforming, it would be a strategic decision for a public manager not to lay off the
teacher.
The same may be also applicable for nonprofit organizations in Chapter 4. Many
nonprofits often struggle with recruiting (good or often any) volunteers (Hager and
Brudney, 2011). In most cases, governing board members are highly qualified or
successful professionals in their fields of expertise. The labor pool of voluntary governing
board members, therefore, is more likely to be scarce (i.e. low level of labor supply).
When a member of the governing board leaves the organization, there is no guarantee that
the nonprofit organization is able to find another qualified candidate in a timely manner.
Minimizing governing board member turnover, therefore, would be a strategic and
reasonable decision for nonprofit managers. Such managerial strategy might be more of a
necessity rather than of a choice for smaller nonprofits. Considering that nonprofits are
often required to have a minimum number of governing board members to keep their
tax-exempt status (Ott and Dicke, 2016), smaller nonprofits would be more vulnerable to
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governing board turnover. If a nonprofit organization has slightly more governing board
members than the minimum requirement, they would be more cautious not to let go of
governing board members, even though the member has not been well performing.
5.3 Implications for Theory and Practice
This dissertation offers key implications for both theory and practice of public and
nonprofit management. First, managers and scholars in the fields should be aware of the
existence of optimal turnover rates in every organization, which also indicate that the
relationship between turnover and organizational performance is more likely to be
nonlinear. Recent empirical studies on turnover and performance in the public sector (An,
2015; Meier and Hicklin, 2008; Moon, 2017) provide support to this argument; yet, many
studies in the field of business management find a negative effect of turnover on
performance. This suggests the sectoral differences with regard to optimal turnover rates.
To illustrate, private firms tend to have higher turnover rates, while public organizations
in general have a much lower level of turnover rates. Given the inverted-U shaped
relationship between turnover and performance, since private firms have a higher level of
turnover, findings of linear and negative relationship might indicate that only the right
side of the inverted-U curve is observed in such types of organizations. This means that
the accurate relationship between turnover and organizational performance might have
been hidden due to the wrong assumption on the turnover-performance link.
Second, therefore, to develop more accurate knowledge on the effect of turnover
on organizational performance, examining the turnover-performance link in a variety of
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different contexts should be encouraged. This includes efforts to test the relationship in
various types of public and nonprofit organizations; furthermore, sectoral comparisons
would also advance our understanding on how the optimal turnover rates and the
consequences of turnover can differ by sectors. This could be done using the data from
organizations that operate in both sectors, such as hospitals and nursing homes.
Third, labor market conditions and the quality of employees should be taken into
account for investigating the issues of organizational turnover. Such factors significantly
affect employees’ decisions to stay or leave the organization, as well as organizations’
abilities to find, hire, and retain qualified individuals; needless to say, the
turnover-performance link should be affected by these conditions. Incorporating them is
even more important for public and nonprofit scholars, given that the turnover studies in
the fields have generally ignored them. In addition, public and nonprofit managers indeed
need to have a better understanding of optimal turnover rates and the effect of turnover on
performance, considering that they often do not have sufficient managerial resources to
prevent the occurrence of turnover (e.g., lower levels of salaries and inflexible rewarding
system), compared to managers in private firms. Propositions in Chapter 2 of this
dissertation, would serve as useful starting points for future scholars who want to further
examine the turnover-performance relationship incorporating labor market conditions and
employee quality.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FCAT read pass rates 328 59.64 8.02 25.26 76.19
FCAT math pass rates 328 63.78 8.78 27.18 80.22
Voluntary turnover 327 5.62 3.15 0 20
Involuntary turnover 327 2.04 2.77 0 19.1
Absolute Turnover 261 7.25 4.72 .03 37.5
% Black students 328 18.87 14.21 .83 80.85
% Hispanic students 328 15.67 14.74 0 66.57
% Low income students 268 56.74 12.74 18.92 100
Class size 328 15.34 1.3 10.43 19.01
Teacher experience 261 12.3 1.76 7.26 19.42
Expenses 000s 261 7.16 .72 5.94 10.6
Teacher pay 000s 328 9107.91 17986.54 35.63 54083
Noncertified 261 5.06 4.66 0 29.8
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Table A.2: Categorization of turnover types
Voluntary turnover Involuntary turnover
Inadequate salary Probationary
Lack of opportunity for advancement Low-performance
Dissatisfaction with supervisor Workforce reduction
Dislike of or unsuitable for assigned duties Not reappointed
Family/personal reasons Resignation in lieu of termination
Return to continuing education
Relocation
Retirement
End of temporary assignment
Inadequate benefits
Stress on the job
Spousal relocation
Child rearing
Entrepreneurship
Promotion to a non-teaching position in the district
Transfer to a non-teaching position in the district
Health problems
Source: The teacher exit surveys are provided by the Florida Department of Education.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4
Figure B.1: Histogram of Governing Board Turnover Rates in United Way Organizations.
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